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COMMENTS
The Protection of Trading Interests Act
of 1980: Britain's Response to U.S.
Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement
The extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws has long
generated discontent between the United States and several European
nations.1 While not alone in attributing extraterritorial jurisdiction to
its antitrust laws, the United States is among the minority in this re-
gard,2 joined only by the European Economic Community,3 Austria,4
and the Federal Republic of Germany.' Enforcement of the Sherman
6
1 Extraterritorial jurisdiction extends domestic laws to aliens and foreign corporations who
are acting outside the territory of the forum country. U.S. antitrust laws have an extraterritorial
reach because U.S. policymakers believe that the transnational nature of today's commerce ren-
ders the strictly territorial notion of jurisdiction obsolete. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965); COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN
ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICTS 392-402 (J. Rahl ed. 1970).
2 See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A
COMPARATIVE GUIDE 21 (1979); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
490-91 (2d ed. 1973).
3 Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
4 The Austrian Cartels Act expressly applies to "cartels concluded abroad but affecting the
domestic market" and to "cartels relating to foreign markets." Austrian Federal Act of 22 No-
vember 1972 on Rules Concerning Cartels and Provisions Designed to Preserve the Freedom of
Competition, § 2(2), as published in Bundesgesetzblatt (Austria) (Dec. 12, 1972), as reprinted in
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1 GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, at Austria § 1.0 (loose-leaf binder) (1980).
5 German law explicitly recognizes that national antitrust interests may extend beyond terri-
torial boundaries. Art. 98(2) of the German Act states: "This Law applies to all restraints of
competition which have effect within the territory to which this Law applies, even if they are
caused from outside the territory to which this Law applies." Act Against Restraints of Competi-
tion, (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen), July 27, 1957, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB I]
11080 (W. Ger.), as republished Apr. 4, 1974, [1974] BGB I 1869, amended, Law of June 28, 1976,
[1976] BGB1 I 917.
In addition to the German, Austrian, and Community laws, the Australian Trade Practices
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and Clayton Acts7 extends to activities that occur in the course of for-
eign commerce which substantially affect either foreign or interstate
commerce.
8
As a result of the overhanging jurisdiction claimed by the United
States, a number of foreign countries have legislated to protect their
residents from the long arm of U.S. antitrust law.9 These countries per-
Act of 1974, AcTs AUSTL. P. 397 (1974 Supp.), s amended Act, 1975, No. 63; Act, 1976, No. 88;
Act, 1977, No. 81; Act, 1977, No. 151; and Act, 1978, No. 206 extends to extraterritorial actions,
although its application thus far has been limited. See Taylor, The Extraterritoriality ofthe Aus-
tralian Antitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 273 (1979).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1976).
7 Jurisdiction exists under sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act only if the seller or buyer is
"engaged in commerce", which means either interstate domestic or foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27, 44 (1976); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1976).
8 Section 1 of the Sherman Act bars "[e]very contract, combination. .. or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations. ... Section 2
makes it a violation of law to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations .. " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Although there is no set definition of
the Sherman Act's jurisdiction, one expert has suggested that it covers a restraint or monopoliza-
tion either occuring in the course of foreign commerce, or affecting foreign or interstate commerce.
Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523
(1974). This articulation of the Act's scope was quoted with approval in Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976). The Department of Justice, on the other
hand, endorsed a "substantial and foreseeable effect" standard in its ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL OPERATIONS. Citing several leading cases, including United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), in which the doctrine was first articulated, the GUIDE
announced "[w]hen foreign transactions have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. com-
merce, they are subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place." ANTITRUST DIVISION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6 & n.13
(rev. ed. 1977), reprintedin 799 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977). See
Remarks of Donald L. Flexner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, before the Antitrust Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga.,
Antitrust Enforcement in United States Foreign Commerce--'Imperialism' or Realism?, (Dec. 6,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Realism]. For a recent digest of pertinent cases, see Annot.,
40 A.L.R. Fed. 393 (1978).
9 Recently, Australia enacted the Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement)
Act, 1979, No. 13 (Austl.). That Act was a direct response to the prospect of huge default judg-
ments or punitive damage awards in U.S. antitrust suits against several Australian nationals in the
Westinghouse litigation. See notes 54-89 infra and accompanying text. The Act provides that
when a foreign court has rendered a judgment in antitrust proceedings, the Australian Attorney
General may declare the judgment unrecognizable or unenforceable in Australia, if he is satisfied
that the court exceeded its jurisdiction and that the judgment would or might be detrimental to
Australian trade or to a financial or trading corporation formed within the Commonwealth. 1979,
No. 13, § 3 (AustL). See Daily Hansard (AustL), House of Representatives, Mar. 7, 1979, at 730
(daily ed. of PARL. DEB. (AustL)).
In addition, Canada and South Africa have modified their laws so as to block information
that might otherwise be obtainable to plaintiffs in U.S. antitrust litigation. See Canada's Atomic
Energy Control Act of 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. c. A-19 (1970), as implemented by the Uranium
Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0. & R. 77-836 (1977) (replacing Uranium Information
Security Regulations, STAT. 0. & R. 76-644 (1976)) and the South African Atomic Energy Act of
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ceive antitrust law as a facet of national economic policy and conse-
quently regard the extension of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction beyond
national borders as inappropriate.' 0 Britain and several other Com-
monwealth countries have urged the United States to rely on political
consultation and negotiation when foreign nationals have seemingly
transgressed American antitrust laws in activities abroad." In this
manner, competing national policies can be evaluated.'
2
1967, 15 STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. 1043(l)-1045 (1978); amended by the Atomic Energy Amendment
Act of 1978, 15 STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. 1061 (1978). See § 30A of the 1978 amendment to the South
African Act in particular, which proscribes communication of information "connected with con-
versations, discussions, meetings or negotiations of any nature whatsoever, which took place be-
tween 1 January 1972 and 31 December 1975, between producers of source material or any
derivatives or compounds thereof, whether in or outside the Republic, in connection with the
production, importation... use or sale [of uranium]. ... 15 STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. 1061 (1978).
See generall In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
Schwechter and Schepard, The Effects of United States Antitrurt Laws on the International Opera-
tions ofAmerican Firms, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 492, 506-07 (1979).
10 See Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in .4ntitrust Litiga-
lion, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 613 n.5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Disclosure Note]; 940 ANTI-
TRUST TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA), at A-8 (Nov. 22, 1979); Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 736
(view of the Australian Parliament); 946 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-24 (Jan.
10, 1980) (view of Australia). For views of the former British Commonwealth states see generally,
[1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,414. See also Economic Imperialism, Wash. Post, Dec. 11,
1979, § A at 14.
The common element among national antitrust laws is their support of economic competi-
tion. Only a few nations have adopted the American system of prohibitions, enforced by judicial
or administrative civil sanctions, with perhaps criminal penalties and private suits as well. Other
countries have adopted a registration system which requires that specified classes of restrictive
agreements be registered with public authorities, who generally have the power to require changes
in the agreements or to declare them void. J. RAHL & R. KENNEDY, ANTITRUST LAW 2-148
(1979) (unpublished course materials for Antitrust Law, Northwestern University). See Taylor,
supra note 5, at 273; Baker, 4ntitrust Conflicts Between Friends: Canada and the United States in
the Mid-1970"s, 11 CORNELL J. INT'L L. 165, 166 (1978).
11 See [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,415; Department of Trade of the United King-
dom, Press Notice Ref. 445, Protection of Trading Interests Bill Published (Oct. 31, 1979) [herein-
after cited as Oct. U.K. Press Notice]; Diplomatic Note from the British Embassy in Washington,
D.C. to the U.S. Department of State, Nov. 27, 1979, reprinted in Department of Trade of the
United Kingdom, Press Notice Ref. 523, Note No. 225 (Dec. 4, 1979) [hereinafter cited as British
Diplomatic Note].
By enacting the Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act, the Australian government sought to trans-
fer the conflict resolution from the U.S. judiciary to bilateral negotiations among policymakers.
This Act empowers the Attorney General to refuse recognition of final orders of foreign courts.
Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 738.
12 Foreign countries that object to the extraterritorial scope of U.S. antitrust laws usually have
urged either that the alleged international anticompetitive behavior be made a matter for political
resolution or that domestic courts defer to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of other na-
tions. At different times, the Australian Parliament, for example, has insisted upon each of these
two alternatives. See Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 738; 946 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA), at A-24 (Jan. 10, 1980); Dep't of Trade of the United Kingdom, Press Notice (Sept. 14,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Sept. U.K. Press Notice]. The latter alternative is the principle of inter-
national comity, which is defined in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), as one nation "having
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Over the past thirty years, foreign reaction to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws has been manifested in diplomatic protest and
the passage of various statutes. 13 The most recent resort by a foreign
country to legislation resulted in the British Protection of Trading In-
terests Act (Trading Interests Act), passed by Parliament in March
1980.14 The Act shares with several prior foreign statutes the aim of
thwarting the exercise of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
citizens. 5 Although the Act's objective resembles that of previous for-
eign legislation, its scope and its methods are unprecedented. 16
Prior foreign statutes were defensive in nature and sought to im-
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Id. at 164.
On Sept. 14, 1979, the British Secretary of State for Trade, in a speech to the British-Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles stated: "The economic interdependence of the West-
ern nations, particularly the very large financial and business investment between the US and UK
requires considerable sensitivity when it comes to the effects of one nation's actions on the other.
It demonstrates the desirability of intergovernment discussion rather than unilateral action to
solve multilateral problems." Sept. U.K. Press Notice, supra, at 16.
13 Eg., (1) Canada-The Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 54 (1970); The
Business Concerns Records Act, QUE. REV. STAT. c. 278 (1964); The Atomic Energy Control Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. c. A-19 (1970), as implemented by The Uranium Information Security Regula-
tions, STAT. 0. & R. 77-837 (1976) (replacing Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT.
0. & R. 76-644 (1976)); (2) Great Britain-The Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents
Act, 1964, c. 87, as modjffed by The Transfer of Functions (Shipping and Construction of Ships)
Order, 1965, STAT. INST. No. 145, 1 2, and Ministry of Aviation Supply (Dissolution) Order, 1971,
STAT. INST. No. 719, 1 2(l) (1971); (3) Australia-The Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Cer-
tain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121 (Austl.), as amended by The Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition
of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No. 202 (Austl.), as implemented by Order of the
Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No. S. 214 (Nov. 29, 1976); (4) Netherlands-Economic
Competition Act of June 28, 1956, [1956] Staatsblad voor het Koninrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.]
No. 401, as amended [1958] Stb. No. 413, as reprinted in 2 GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRIC-
TIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, supra note 4, at Netherlands § 1.0; (5) Switzerland--Codice penal suiz-
zero §§ 271-74 (Dec. 21, 1937) (as amended); (6) South Africa-The Atomic Energy Act of 1978,
15 STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. 1061 (1978).
For recent analysis of foreign nondisclosure laws, see Rahl, Enforcement and Discovery Con-
flicts: 4 Viewfrom the United States, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, FIFTH ANNUAL FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 347-55 (B. Hawk ed. 1979); Lever, Aspects ofJurisdictional Conflict in
the Field of-Discovery, in id. at 364-74; Foreign Disclosure Note, supra note 10, at 612; Note,
Discovery ofDocuments Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the
Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excusefor Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Foreign Excuse Note].
14 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11.
15 See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 45-51 (1958); Forein
Disclosure Note, supra note 10, at 613 n.5; COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST:
OVERLAP AND CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 118.
16 The underlying purpose of the British Act is, as is the purpose of the 1979 Australian Act, to
insulate certain actions of foreign parties from judgment and sanctions by U.S. courts and, failing
that, to assure that substantial deference is paid to the policies of the foreign state.
479
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pede U.S. extraterritorial litigation at the discovery17 and enforcement
stages."i The Trading Interests Act similarly incorporates a document
nondisclosure provision,19 as well as a restriction on the enforcement of
foreign treble damage awards and certain antitrust judgments. 20  The
failure of prior British laws to bar what Britain perceives as infringe-
ment on its sovereignty by U.S. courts, however, has prompted the
Trading Interests Act which, for the first time, includes offensive meas-
ures.2 1 Specific defendants are now entitled to recover noncompensa-
tory damages paid in a foreign court by attaching any assets of the
winning plaintiff located in the United Kingdom.2 2  Furthermore,
under certain circumstances a winning plaintiff's assets in the United
Kingdom are susceptible to attachment by a defendant of a third coun-
try as compensation for punitive damages that the defendant has
paid.23 Moreover, this provision is premised on reciprocity so that a
losing British defendant may be able to recover against the plaintiff's
17 The Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, QUE. REV. STAT. C. 278 (1964), the British
Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87, the Australian Foreign Proceed-
ings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121 (Austl.), and the Dutch Economic Com-
petition Act, [1956] Stb. No. 401, as amended [19581 Stb. No. 413, are representative. While most
of these statutes were not expressly enacted to thwart antitrust discovery, they were all aimed at
blocking what was perceived as U.S. encroachment on national sovereignty. However effective
these statutes have been in restricting access to information, they have proven inadequate to ac-
complish their objective since litigation has taken place anyway. See Shifrin, Antitrust Action
Pledged Despite Foreign Laws, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1978, § D, at 1.
18 The Australian Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121
(Austl.), was the first foreign statute to counteract private U.S. antitrust litigation by proscribing
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Australia is, however, only able to prevent
recovery of foreign judgments within its own territory. Australian nationals abroad remain vul-
nerable, as do their foreign based assets. See Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 732, 735.
19 1980, c. 11, § 2. See text accompanying notes 120-31 infra.
20 1980, c. 11, § 6. See text accompanying notes 132-36 infra.
21 To a certain extent, the protection afforded foreign nationals by existing foreign laws has
been undermined in the United States by court decisions. In United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968), the Second Circuit held that the United States' interest in its
antitrust discovery procedures outweighed both the German interest in its bank secrecy doctrine
and the potential liability the defendant Bank faced for not producing German-based documents
sought in a grand jury investigation. Such decisions clearly notify foreign defendants that U.S.
judicial proceedings will not always be modified to accommodate foreign interests. See Note, The
Use of Section 40, Restatement (Second), The Foreign Relations Law of the United States to Deter-
mine Whether to Compel the Production of Documents Abroad, 6 HARV. LEoAL COMMENTARY 43
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Restatement Note]; Shifrin, note 17 supra and Foreign Excuse Note,
note 13 supra. Additionally, the federal courts treat a failure to respond to or to contest a com-
plaint as a confession, leading to a default judgment and liability for full damages. See, e.g., In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation (Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom), 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.
1980). Foreign statutes that pre-date the Trading Interests Act do not mitigate this result.
22 1980, c. 11, § 6. See text accompanying notes 137-49 infra.
23 1980, c. 11, § 7. See text accompanying notes 150-52 infra.
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assets in an otherwise disinterested third country.2 4
To promote the objectives of the Act, the Secretary of State is
granted unusually broad enforcement powers including some previ-
ously exercised by the judiciary. For example, a decision to release
information for evidentiary purposes to litigants in foreign courts is no
longer made solely by the judiciary.25 The Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act authorizes the Secretary of State to prohibit compliance with a
foreign court's letter of request if the information sought infringes on
British sovereignty or would prejudice national security or foreign
trade relations.26  By transferring this authority to a political official,
Parliament has enabled the government to respond flexibly and aggres-
sively to suits by U.S. litigants that intrude on British sovereignty.
Although clearly a reaction to the pending Westinghouse uranium
cartel litigation' and the potentially huge judgments involved, the im-
pact of the Protection of Trading Interests Act extends beyond that liti-
gation. First, the Act poses major new obstacles to the successful
resolution and enforcement of U.S. extraterritorial antitrust suits
against foreign defendants.2 1 Second, it represents an attempt by Brit-
ain to induce the United States to alter the application of its antitrust
laws with regard to the activities of foreign nationals beyond U.S. terri-
tory.29 Presently, a private party is encouraged to sue on an antitrust
violation by the treble damage remedy. 0 A private suit is initiated and
24 1980, c. 1,§7.
25 See text accompanying notes 120-31 infra.
26 1980, c. 1 I, § 2(2).
27 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., No. 76-C3830 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 15, 1976).
See text accompanying notes 36-89 infra. For an informative overview of the lengthy Westing-
house litigation, see Wood & Carrera, The International Uranium Cartel- Litigation and Legal
Implications, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 59 (1979); Note, Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence (Pro-
ceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, I1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323, 324 n.4 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Discovery Note]; Merhige, The Westinghouse Uranium Case; Problems Encountered in Seeking
Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L LAW. 19 (1979).
28 See text accompanying notes 159-264 infra.
29 For general commentary on the Trading Interests Act, see 9 INT'L PRACTITIONER'S
NOTEBOOK 1 (1980); Baker, U.K. Using New Weapons to Attack Foreign Reach of U.S. Trust
Laws, Nat'l L. J., Jan. 14, 1980, at 24. See also Dep't of Trade of the United Kingdom, Press
Notice Ref. 523 (Dec. 4, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Dec. U.K. Press Notice].
30 A treble damage provision, permitting "[a]ny person who shall be injured... [to] recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee" was part of the original Sherman Act. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976)). The original § 7 was repealed in 1955 and superceded by § 4 of
the Clayton Act, c. 283, § 4, 69 Stat. 283 (1955) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)), which
reenacted a treble damage provision. This remedy derives from the British Statute of Monopolies,
1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 4, which was repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1969, c. 52. This
statute evidently had fallen into disuse by the 18th century, although multiple damage provisions
still appear elsewhere in English law. See, e.g., Distress for Rent Act, 1689, 2 W. & M. 77, c. 5, § 3
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adjudicated without consideration of possible political repercussions or
complications resulting from the involvement of a foreign defendant.3
By threatening a winning plaintiff with a British action that would re-
claim any compensatory portion of this treble damages award, the
Trading Interests Act is designed to discourage private extraterritorial
antitrust suits, at least insofar as British commerce is affected.32
Private litigants in the United States will find that the cost of litiga-
tion against foreign defendants far exceeds any benefit to be derived.33
If private antitrust litigation can no longer be induced by the promise
of treble damages, enforcement of these laws is certain to decline. Even
if enforcement by the Department of Justice expands, it is unlikely to
(treble damages), § 4 (double damages), reprinted in 9 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 511
(3d ed. 1969).
31 There are risks associated with enabling private suits against foreign defendants to proceed
merely because a substantial effect on American foreign or interstate commerce is shown. For
example, U.S. foreign policy and international relations may be jeopardized by attendant jurisdic-
tional controversies. One observer has advocated a statutory prohibition on private suits. Snyder,
Foreign Investment and Trade." Extraterritorial Impact of United States Antitrust Law, 6 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 36-37 (1965).
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), Judge Choy
suggested instead, a judicial evaluation and balancing of the foreign interests and commercial
consequences involved. Id. at 613. He remarked that sensitivity to foreign implications of extra-
territorial enforcement of U.S. laws "is especially required in private suits, for in these cases there
is no opportunity for the executive branch to weigh the foreign relations impact, nor any statement
implicit in the filing of the suit that that consideration has been outweighed." Id. In contrast, at
an early stage in its investigations of foreign parties, the Justice Department notifies those foreign
governments that may have an interest in the case. See Antitrust Realism, supra note 8, at 7-8.
The United States is a party to several arrangements calling for international notification and
consultation about antitrust enforcement proceedings. These include: a bilateral executive agree-
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany, Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation on
Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27
U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, reprinted in [19781 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 50,283; an infor-
mal understanding with Canada, Canada- United States Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation in
Antitrust Matters, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1305 (1969); two Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) Council recommendations, O.E.C.D. Recommendation on
Notification and Co-operation, C(67) 53 (final), Oct. 10, 1967 and Recommendations of the Coun-
cil, C(73) 99 (final), Oct. 3, 1973; and a decision by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
organization to cooperate in lessening the harmful effects of restrictive business practices. See
Marks, State Department Perspectives on Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
153 (1978).
32 See British Diplomatic Note, note 11 supra. The British government stated that one of its
major objections to the private treble damage action provided by U.S. antitrust laws, is that "the
usual discretion of a public authority to enforce laws in a way which has regard to the interests of
society is replaced by a motive on the part of the plaintiff to pursue defendants for private gain
thus excluding considerations of a public nature." Id. This objection finds redress in § 6 'f the
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 1 I, which enables losing defendants to recover non-
compensatory damages through suit against a plaintiff's British-based assets.
33 For a general discussion of the protracted nature of antitrust litigation, see Wall St. J., Aug.
29, 1978, at 14, col. 4.
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compensate for the predictable decrease in private suits. Thus, the
Trading Interests Act constitutes a major challenge to the extraterrito-
rial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws.
This comment will first examine the impetus for the Trading Inter-
ests Act. A discussion of the Westinghouse uranium contracts litiga-
tion34 and the Justice Department's prosecution of three European
shipping lines35 will highlight the three British objections to U.S. extra-
territorial antitrust enforcement that motivated the passage of the Act:
(1) U.S. intrusions on British sovereignty; (2) the availability of a treble
damage remedy to private litigants; and (3) the inattention of U.S.
courts to considerations of international comity. Second, this comment
will describe the provisions of the Trading Interests Act and analyze
their import. The Act affects the availability of discovery to foreign
courts and authorities as well as the recognition and enforcement of
foreign multiple damage and antitrust judgments. It empowers the
Secretary of State to prohibit compliance by persons in the United
Kingdom with overseas measures affecting British trade or security in-
terests. Additionally, the Act creates a new cause of action which per-
mits qualifying defendants who have paid noncompensatory damages
on a foreign judgment to recover in Britain against the assets of the
winning foreign plaintiff.
Finally, this comment will assess the Act's implications for current
United States antitrust enforcement practices. The British statute may
trigger the need for a re-evaluation of the viability of U.S. antitrust
enforcement procedures, especially as they concern private suits. The
recovery or "claw back" provision of the Act, in particular, will consid-
erably raise the stakes for private litigants, and will thus minimize pri-
vate antitrust enforcement.
IMPETUS FOR THE BRITISH LAW
The impetus for the British Protection of Trading Interests Act is
directly traceable to the protracted Westinghouse uranium cartel litiga-
tion which began in 1975.36 This litigation provoked Britain and the
34 See text accompanying notes 36-89 infra.
35 See text accompanying notes 90-98 infra.
36 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975). See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.
1980); Discovery Note, supra note 27, at 324 n.4 (summarizing the complex litigations involved);
Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 731; [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,414. A press notice
issued on Oct. 31, 1979, by the British Department of Trade expressly attributes the introduction
of the Protection of Trading Interests bill to the Westinghouse litigation and a grand jury indict-
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other countries whose nationals were defendants. 7 The disputed issues
are best understood through a brief summary of the litigation.
In 1975, twenty-seven separate suits were brought against the
Westinghouse Electric Corporation for breaching contracts to supply
uranium to electric utility companies. 8 Westinghouse responded inter
alia with a defense of commercial impracticability arising from an in-
temational uranium producers cartel,39 consisting of corporations from
Canada, Britain, South Africa and Australia. This cartel allegedly de-
nied Westinghouse access to supplies and conspired to raise the market
price of uranium, which had increased eightfold.4" To sustain its com-
mercial impracticability defense, Westinghouse sought to produce
thousands of documents located abroad by utilizing the letters rogatory
procedure.4 Both the Canadian42 and Australian43 courts refused to
honor the letters of request, referring to the discretionary nature of this
procedure and the existence of domestic laws and policies which con-
flicted with disclosure.'
ment of several European shipping lines. Oct. U.K. Press Notice, note II supra. See notes 90-92
and accompanying text infra.
37 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155-56 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View
from Abroad, I 1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 204-14 (1978) (discussing the alleged infringement of
political and national security policies); Baker, note 10 supra; Oct. U.K. Press Notice, note I 1
supra (addressing disputes over sovereignty, jurisdiction, and discovery in a foreign country).
38 For detailed analysis of the issues presented and argued in In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975), see Wood & Carrera, note 27
supra; Discovery Note, supra note 27, at 324 n.4; Merhige, note 27 supra; Lever, note 13 supra.
39 436 F. Supp. at 991.
40 Id. at 994.
41 Letters rogatory are "the medium ... whereby one country, speaking through one of its
courts, requests another country, acting through its own courts and by methods of court procedure
peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration ofjustice in the
former country." The Signe (Tiedmann v. The Signe), 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941), case
decidedsub nom. The Florida, 39 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. La. 1941), a ffd sub nom. The Florida, 133
F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1943). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-84 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b); 14A BENDER'S
FORMS OF DISCOVERY § 13.05[3] (1974). For further discussion of foreign reaction to the use of
letters rogatory by U.S. courts, see Rahl, note 13 supra; Foreign Disclosure Note, note 10 supra;
Discovery Note, note 27 supra.
42 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (J.P.M.D.L.
1975); Wood & Carrera, supra note 27, at 93-96.
43 Merhige, supra note 27, at 20.
44 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3 (Ont. 1977), cited
in Wood & Carrera, supra note 27, at 93. Westinghouse applied to the High Court of Justice for
the Province of Ontario for enforcement of the letters rogatory against individuals connected with
four Canadian corporations, but the High Court refused. Australia also refused to grant the let-
ters of request. Wood & Carrera, supra note 27, at 94 n. 168. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Il. 1979); Stanford, supra note 37, at 204-06.
The Attorney General of Canada intervened in the judicial proceedings and filed an affidavit
that indicated that the "informal marketing arrangement of non-United States producers" of ura-
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Unlike its Australian and Canadian counterparts, however, the
High Court of England gave effect to the letters rogatory,45 pursuant to
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters,46 to which both Britain and the United States are
signatories.47 The parties and corporations named in the letters refused
to testify, claiming privilege under the fifth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and comparable E.E.C. and British safeguards.4 8 In an
unusual step,49 the U.S. Department of Justice assured the presiding
nium was intended to stabilize the uranium market. Wood & Carrera, supra note 27, at 93. Fur-
thermore, the affidavit claimed Crown privilege with respect to the documents sought, and
explained that disclosure was not in the public interest. Id. In refusing to enforce the letters, the
Canadian court stressed that granting them was a matter of international comity which will not be
exercised in violation of the public policy of the state to which the request is made. Id. at 93-94.
Furthermore, the court doubted that the letters sought evidence that was properly within the lim-
ited scope of the letters rogatory procedure. The court decided that letters rogatory could only be
used to acquire evidence that was either absolutely necessary for the requesting court to render
justice or that was directly admissible at trial. It concluded that Westinghouse was not requesting
either sort of evidence. Id. Moreover, the court found itself precluded from granting the applica-
tion by the Uranium Information Security Regulations which made it an offense to disclose docu-
ments or materials relating to the uranium pricing arrangements. STAT. 0. & R. 76-644, § 3
(1976), revised by STAT. 0. & R. 77-836 (1977).
In response to the letters rogatory directed to the court in New South Wales, the Australian
government hastily enacted legislation which made the disclosure of information on subjects
thereafter designated by the Attorney General, including uranium, a criminal offense. See the
Foreign Procedures (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121 (Austl.). For an account
of the haste with which the legislation was enacted, see Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 731.
45 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, [1977]
3 All E.R. 703 (C.A. 1977), rev'd, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977). See Wood & Carrera, supra
note 27, at 97-100.
46 The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters of 1968, openedfor signature Mar. 18, 1970, 658 U.N.T.S., established procedures for comply-
ing with foreign discovery requests in the form of letters rogatory. The Convention was executed
in the United Kingdom by the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34. See
Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidencefor Use in Litigation in the United States: Ex-
isting Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAW. 3, 10 n.10 (1979).
47 The other parties to the Hague Convention are Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. Carter, supra note 46, at 10 n.10.
48 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Appellants argued that the Evidence Act should permit them the
same privileges against compelled evidence that a person would typically have in the forum juris-
diction, that is, in the U.S. The British appellants also contended that by complying they would
be exposed to prosecution under European Economic Community Law by virtue of article 85 of
the Treaty of Rome, which prohibits cartels, and article 15(2) of the EEC Council Regulations,
Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 89-90 (H.L. 1977). See 13 J.O.
COMM. EuR. 204, 209 (1962), which authorizes the European Commission to enforce penalties
under article 85; see generaly Wood & Carrera, supra note 27, at 97.
49 The Department of Justice has a policy against offering immunity to secure testimony in
private litigation "except in the most extraordinary circumstances." Letter from the Attorney
General of the United States to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia
(July 12, 1977), reprinted in part in Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R.
81, 91 (H.L. 1977). The Justice Department's intercession in a private action was apparently so
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U.S. district court judge that since the evidence requested by the letters
rogatory might be indispensable to a grand jury investigation of the
uranium cartel underway in Washington,5" the witnesses' testimony
would be immunized from use in criminal prosecution in the United
States.5 The British defendants appealed to the House of Lords, both
as to the appellate court's order that the letters be effectuated and as to
their entitlement to immunity from testifying under the fifth amend-
ment privilege.52 On several grounds, the House of Lords denied effect
to the letters.53  That decision discouraged any further attempts by
Westinghouse to obtain documents in the breach of contract action.
The activities of the international uranium cartel also formed the
basis of a separate antitrust action lodged by Westinghouse in October
1976 against twelve foreign and seventeen domestic uranium produ-
cers. 54 In this case, nine of the twelve foreign defendants rejected out-
right the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. district court by failing to
appear or otherwise reply to Westinghouse's complaint.55 Final default
judgments were entered against these firms in January 197956 and tem-
extraordinary that, according to Lord Wilberforce of the British High Court, it was unprece-
dented. Id. at 94. See also Cira, Jr., Current Problems in the Extraterritorial4pplication of U.S.
Antitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157, 159 (1978); Bell, International Comity andthe Extrater-
ritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws, 51 AUST'L L.J. 801, 802 (1977).
50 In 1976, the Justice Department convened a grand jury in Washington, D.C. to investigate
the alleged international uranium cartel. See Burnham, Data Show U.S. Rejected Effort to Prose-
cute a Uranium Cartel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, § A at I, col. 5; Bukro, U.S. Probing Uranium
Cartel, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 2, 1976, § 3 at 1; see generally Hearings on the International Ura-
nium Carte/Before the Subcomna on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
51 [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 92-94. See Wood & Carrera, supra note 27, at 98-99; Discovery Note,
supra note 27, at 325 n.7.
52 [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 93.
53 Id. at 93-94. Most significantly, the Lords asserted that the Justice Department's interven-
tion into the private civil proceedings changed it into a criminal matter and negated the applica-
bility of the Evidence Act. Under section l(b) of the Evidence Act, letters rogatory may be used
before the initiation of a civil suit, but, under section 5, they may not be used before the initiation
of a criminal proceeding. Since a grand jury investigation comes before any formal criminal
charge, the information it might request of British residents or citizens can not be legally provided.
The High Court also acknowledged the long-term British policy in opposition to U.S. extra-
territorial investigations of U.K. companies. Lord Wilberforce asserted: "The courts should in
such matters speak with the same voice as the executive," thereby deferring to the government
view that British sovereignty would be infringed by compliance with the letters rogatory. Id. at
94.
54 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aft'd 617 F.2d 1248
(7th Cir. 1980).
55 617 F.2d at 1250. In February 1977, the district court entered default judgments pursuant
to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against each of the nine defaulting defend-
ants. Id.
56 Id See generally 898 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-1 (Feb. 8, 1979). The
companies judged in default were four Australian companies (Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia,
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porary restraining orders were imposed on their wholly owned U.S.
subsidiaries that required the firms to give notice to the court twenty
days before assets exceeding $10,000 could be transferred out of the
country. 7 Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the default judgments and the temporary restraining orders.5 8 The
court stayed a determination of damages against the defaulters pending
judgment as to the non-defaulting defendants, unless Westinghouse de-
cided to drop claims against the answering defendants.5 9
Of the active defendants, ten were ordered to produce documents
situated abroad." Upon their refusal to comply, the district judge or-
dered the disclosure of these documents, 6' despite the existence of for-
eign statutes imposing criminal penalties for disclosing the
information 2.6  Rejecting a balancing approach advocated by several
defendants,63 the court maintained that "[it is simply impossible to ju-
Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd., Pancontinental Mining Ltd., and Queensland Mines Ltd.),
two British companies (Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. Ltd. and RTZ Services Ltd.), two South African
companies (Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa and Anglo-American Corporation of
South Africa Ltd.), and one Canadian corporation (Rio Algom Ltd.). 617 F.2d at 1253 n.11.
57 617 F.2d at 1250. The temporary restraining order was effective for a period of nine days,
after which a hearing was held and a preliminary injunction was entered. Within hours of receiv-
ing notice of the temporary restraining order, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. (RTZ), the London parent of
several of the defaulters, instructed employees of its subsidiaries to transfer as much money as
possible from U.S. bank accounts into Canada. Without notifying the district court, approxi-
mately $3,200,000 were transferred from one of the U.S. defaulters to another in Canada. Several
other plans were devised to transfer money from the United States companies to foreign subsidiar-
ies of RTZ. Id. at 1250-52. The appeal was presented for the defaulters by the active defendants,
who argued that their case would be prejudiced by an immediate hearing on the defaulters' dam-
ages, such as the district court had held to be appropriate. In addition, the governments of Austra-
lia, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland fied
briefs as amici curiae. Id. at 1253.
58 Id. at 1256-63.
59 Id. at 1262-63. Four additional defendants satisfied the discovery orders, either by produc-
tion of documents or by summarizing the contents of the requisite material. 480 F. Supp. at 1142.
The ten other defendants invoked foreign law objections based on Canadian, Australian, Swiss,
and South African laws. Id. at 1142-43. In view of the defendants' resulting vulnerability to
criminal prosecution, the main issue was whether they should be compelled to produce documents
that had been withheld. Id. at 1144. The test applied was formulated in Soci6t6 Internationale v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 480 F. Supp. at 1145-48. For a discussion of the Rogers test, see
COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST- OVERLAP AND CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 119.
60 480 F. Supp. at 1142-43.
61 Id. at 1156.
62 Id. at 1143-45.
63 Id. at 1148. The balancing approach urged by several defendants derives from section 40 of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965)
and calls upon the court to balance the interests of each sovereign to determine which predomi-
nates. A number of factors to consider are contained in section 40, such as (a) the vital national
interests of each state, and (b) the extent and nature of the hardships that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person, and (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take
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dicially 'balance' [the] total contradictory and mutually negating ac-
tions" of the United States and the foreign countries to determine
which interest predominates.' Additionally, by demonstrating to the
defendants that they were not immune from sanctions for noncompli-
ance, the court hoped to induce the defendants to take affirmative steps
towards securing the documents.65
The Westinghouse litigation has not yet been concluded,66 but it
has already provoked widespread controversy and resulted in the mod-
ification or enactment of five foreign statutes,67 the most important of
which is the British Protection of Trading Interests Act.6" The Westing-
house case is not the first extraterritorial antitrust suit against multina-
tional defendants to arouse foreign antipathy.69 There are three
place in the territory of the other state. The specific actions referred to by the Court are the
United States' enforcement of its laws, and the interference created by foreign countries who per-
ceive such enforcement to be an infringement of their sovereignty.
64 Apparently, the Justice Department felt that the district court had improperly waived the
comity issue. In a formal statement of interest by the United States, posted May 6, 1980, Associate
Attorney General John H. Shenefield urged Judge Prentice H. Marshall to give "appropriate def-
erence and weight [to the views and representations advanced by foreign governments] in resolv-
ing legal questions that turn, at least in part, on considerations of international comity." More
significantly, the statement asserted "that it would be inappropriate, in the absence of bad faith, to
inflict punishment against a defendant in the above-captioned case for inability to comply with a
discovery order of the court because of a contrary foreign criminal law. ... [1980] 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,416.
65 480 F. Supp. at 1156.
66 Adjudication on the merits was scheduled for September 1980. Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, at
1; N.Y. Times, July 9, 1978, § 3, at 1, col. 6.
67 The first three of these statutes restrict or prohibit access by foreign parties to certain infor-
mation. Discovery Note, supra note 27, at 341 n.132 (1978). Discovery in the uranium litigation
prompted the passage in Canada of the Atomic Energy Control Act. CAN. REv. STAT. c. A-19
(1970), and the Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0. & R., 77-836 (1977) (replac-
ing Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0. & R. 76-644) (promulgated pursuant to
this Act). Additionally, following the issuance of letters rogatory in the Westinghouse litigation,
the Australian Parliament passed criminal legislation for the production of documents concerning
subjects specified by the Attorney General, among which uranium was immediately designated.
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121 (AustL), as amended by
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No. 202 (Austl.), as
implemented by Order of the Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No. S. 214 (Nov. 29, 1976). See
Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 731.
South Africa's statute predates the uranium litigation. It was modified in 1978 "for the ex-
press purpose of frustrating the jurisdiction of the United States courts over the activities of the
alleged international uranium cartel." In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1143 (N.D. Ill. 1979). For a discussion of the South African statute, see note 9 supra.
The two most recently enacted statutes foreclose enforcement or registration of certain for-
eign judgments. They are the Australian Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforce-
ment) Act, 1979, No. 121 (Austl.), and the British Protection of Foreign Trading Interests Act,
1980, c. 11. See [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,414.
68 1980, c. 11.
69 Beginning in 1945 with the decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
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reasons, however, for Westinghouse's extraordinary effect.
First, Westinghouse threatens the survival of industries critical to
the well-being of foreign nations.7" The plaintiffs are seeking treble
damages under the Clayton Act,7 ' which could amount to six billion
dollars." This award would devastate Australia's uranium industry
and injure that of Britain, Canada, and South Africa.73 By providing
for treble damages, Congress intended the antitrust laws to be prophy-
lactic and sought to encourage private attorneys general to prosecute
violations.74 Foreign governments, however, have long protested that
such damages, which are uniquely American,75 are penal and hence,
should not be available to private plaintiffs.76
Second, each of the foreign courts which received letters rogatory
suggested that the substance of the requests and possibly the purpose
for which they were intended as well, constituted an attempt to abuse
this procedure.77 Extensive use of pretrial discovery in the United
States has no foreign counterpart.78 Even in a noncontroversial case, a
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), the Supreme Court has rejected a "strict territorial" view ofjurisdiction,
embracing instead an "objective territorial projection" of the antitrust laws. After Alcoa, the
Court applied the Sherman Act to an agreement between two foreign nationals to fix quotas on
sales, holding that it tended to provide the defenders with an illegal advantage by restraining
imports to the United States. United States v. National Lead, 332 U.S. 319 (1946). For cases
where foreign countries have protested U.S. litigation against their nationals for violations of anti-
trust law, see BREWSTER, supra note 15, at 45-51.
70 The personal view of the Director General of the Canadian Bureau of Commercial and
Commodity Relations, Department of External Affairs, was that the Westinghouse litigation had
brought a new dimension to the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction since the case "involve[d] the
intervention of governments seeking to protect the most vital natural resources of their econo-
mies." Stanford, supra note 37, at 201. The Canadians, the South Africans, and the Australians
protested the infringements of national security more than did the British, who took a broader
stance and rejected outright any extraterritorial prosecution of U.S. laws. See In re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 477
(1978).
71 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
72 See Transcripts of Proceedings, Mar. 27, 1979, at 8 and June 20, 1979 at 11, In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 342, No. 76-C3830, cited in Amicus Curiae Brief of the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom, at 2 (Aug. 2, 1979).
73 See Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 733, 737; 946 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA),
at A-25 (Jan. 10, 1980).
74 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-47 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 881
(1977); Essex Int'l, Inc. v. Industra Prod., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 361, 363 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
75 For discussion of foreign protest against U.S. treble damage remedy, see BREWSTER, supra
note 15, at 45-51; Carter, supra note 46, at 6-9; Foreign Disclosure Note, supra note 10, at 613 n.5.
The uniqueness of treble damages is discussed in note 30supra. See Antitrust Realism, supra note
8, at 13; [1979] 4 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 31,130; Oct. U.K. Press Notice, supra note 11, at 1, 5.
76 See British Diplomatic Note, note 11 supra.
77 See note 44 supra.
78 See Carter, supra note 46, at 5-9; Rahl, Enforcement and Discovery Conflicds.: A Viewfrom
the United States, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, FIFTH ANNUAL FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
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foreign court will deny the release of information that would not be
similarly available to litigants in that country.79 Additionally, in the
Westinghouse suit, national security considerations have made foreign
governments particularly unwilling to allow the disclosure of docu-
ments or information on uranium production and marketing arrange-
ments.8 0  Furthermore, the British courts, which initially were
amenable to the letters of request,8 ' ultimately refused to compel either
the required testimony or production of the documents because the Jus-
tice Department's intervention to immunize the parties' testimony was
deemed to have transformed the private civil proceedings into a crimi-
nal proceeding.82 The House of Lords concluded its opinion by finding
"that the attempt to extend the grand jury investigation extra-territori-
ally into the activities of the [British] companies was an infringement of
United Kingdom sovereignty."83
Third, the defaulting foreign defendants may be held liable for
satisfying all of Westinghouse's alleged damages, since antitrust de-
fendants are jointly and severally liable,84 and their failure to contest
the complaint is construed as an admission.85 The appeal of the active
defendants to the Seventh Circuit prevented the district court from
holding an immediate hearing 6 to set damages, but the district court's
INSTITUTE 346 (B. Hawk ed. 1979).
79 See Carter, supra note 46, at 5-9.
80 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11. 1979), Wood & Car-
rera, note 27 supra.
81 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1977] 3 All E.R. 703 (C.A.
1977), rev'd. [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H. L. 1977).
82 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977).
83 [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 93. Foreign hostility toward the treble damage provision is understand-
able when the course of the private civil suit and the criminal proceedings are compared. After
four years, the private action brought by Westinghouse against the uranium cartel is still one year
from being heard on the merits and the case threatens multibillion dollar liability. In contrast, the
grand jury returned a one count misdemeanor within a year indicting only one of nine potential
violators. The indicted corporation, Gulf Oil, pleaded no contest and was fined $40,000. See
Burham, note 50 supra; Bukro, note 50 supra.
84 Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, antitrust liability is joint and several. See Bogosian v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977). Since the defaulting defendants have confessed to the
Westinghouse allegations by their refusal to appear, the defaulters may have to accept full respon-
sibility for the damage ultimately proven by Westinghouse as a result of that default. In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1980).
85 617 F.2d at 1260.
86 Id. The Seventh Circuit held that because liability may be joint and because there is a
possibility of inconsistent adjudications, a hearing on the defaulters' damages should await a judg-
ment on the merits of the case of the non-defaulting defendants.
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judgment as to the defaulters was upheld.87 Thus, regardless of the
outcome on the merits for the active defendants, the defaulters will re-
main liable. 8 Moreover, the temporary restraining order imposed on
their American subsidiaries to impede the transfer of certain assets
outside the country, ensures that execution on a future damage award
will not be totally frustrated.89
Another litigation involving enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws
also contributed to the impetus of the British legislation-the recent
Department of Justice prosecution of European shipping lines and their
executives for antitrust violations.9" In June 1979, a Washington grand
jury released criminal indictments against three European and four
American shipping companies, plus thirteen of their executives, for
price fixing violations under section 1 of the Sherman Act.9' The grand
jury investigation, spanning the period from 1971 to 1976, disclosed an
on-going conspiracy to fix freight rates in the North Atlantic liner
trades.
92
Four of the defendants were British, and the reaction of the British
government was immediate and hostile, warning of retaliation for the
"unilateral action" of the United States and of a reappraisal of its coop-
eration with the United States on antitrust matters.93 Several aspects of
the prosecutions especially incensed the British; first, that the U.S.
sought to regulate shipping which is an international activity; and sec-
87 The trial court's default determination was made after waiting two years for the defendants
to appear. Such a determination would only be set aside for an abuse of discretion. 617 F.2d at
1258.
88 This prospect has moved several foreign governments to protest to the United States De-
partment of Justice and the State Department. See [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,416;
946 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-24 (Jan. 10, 1980).
89 See note 57 and accompanying text supra; 953 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at
A-5 (Feb. 28, 1980); Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, at 1, 18. Efforts by the foreign defaulters to evade
the anticipated judgment against them have been encouraged and supported by several of the
foreign governments. See Daily Hansard, supra note 9, at 733.
90 United States v. Atlantic Container Line Ltd., No. 79-00271 (D.D.C., filed June 1, 1979);
United States v. Bates, No. 79-00272 (D.D.C., fied June 1, 1979). See [1979] 4 COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 31,130; 922 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-30 (July 12, 1979).
91 See Dept. of Trade of the United Kingdom, Press Notice Ref. No. 165 (June 4, 1979) [here-
inafter cited as June U.K. Press Notice]; 922 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-3I
(July 12, 1979). The indicted companies included three mainly-European shipping groups:
Hapag-Lloyd, incorporated in the Federal Republic of Germany, Atlantic Container Line and
Dart Container Line, both consortia. Four American companies-Seatrain Lines, United States
Lines, Sea-Lane Services and American Export Lines-were also indicted.
92 922 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-31 (July 12, 1979).
93 June U.K. Press Notice, note 91 supra. The Department of Justice instituted suits against
both the individuals involved in managing the container lines, United States v. Bates, No. 79-
00272 (D.D.C., ified June 1, 1979), and the companies, United States v. Atlantic Container Line
Ltd., No. 79-00271 (D.D.C., filed June 1, 1979). See generally Antitrust Realism, note 8 supra.
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ond, that activities of the defendants, although violative of the Sher-
man Act, would not have been illegal either in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere in Europe.94 Moreover, the expense and duration of anti-
trust cases, in addition to the risk of treble damage actions, induced the
defendants not to contest the charges.95 The resultant fines totalled
$6.1 million, the highest ever imposed under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.96 Despite the nolo contendere plea97 and the out of court settle-
ment, which were specifically intended to minimize the likelihood of
additional private suits being brought, thirty-four suits had been filed
by the end of 1979 which, if successful, could result in damages
amounting to several billion dollars.98 The British government's re-
sentment found expression in the Protection of Trading Interests Act.
BRITAIN'S STATUTORY RESPONSE
The Protection of Trading Interests Act, which was signed into law
on March 20, 1980,99 contains several significant provisions. The Act is
94 Oct. U.K. Press Notice, supra note 11, at Notes to Editors 6. Both the United States and
Britain accept a shipping conference system, but whereas the American Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 814 (1976), confers antitrust immunity only on conference arrangements regulated and approved
by the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission, Britain leaves the regulation of conference activity to
the participating shipping companies. Baker, supra note 10, at 186-87. Under the European legal
system, shipping lines are able to set route rates by means of their traditional conference system.
They may also discount rates to certain customers. 922 ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at
A-30 (July 12, 1979); Oct. U.K. Press Notice, supra note 11, at Notes to Editors 6.
95 Oct. U.K. Press Notice, supra note 11, at Notes to Editors 6. Under § 16(a) of the Clayton
Act, a final judgment in a proceeding brought by the United States is prima facie evidence against
the defendant in an action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant as to
all matters which were decided in the prior action. Consent decrees entered before any testimony
has been taken are excepted. Thus, subsequent private actions do not benefit from res judicata if
the government's case was concluded by a consent decree. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976).
96 Oct. U.K. Press Notice, note II supra. The thirteen individual defendants were fined
$50,000 each and convicted of misdemeanors. The maximum fine of $1 million was imposed on
each of the seven corporate defendants, although three of them eventually had their fines reduced.
Id.
97 A plea of nolo contendere in a criminal antitrust case does not constitute prima facie evi-
dence of a violation in any subsequent private civil antitrust action for treble damages. City of
Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963). See FED. R. EvID. 410.
98 Oct. U.K. Press Notice, supra note 11, at Notes to Editors 6. The British were further
incensed by the inconsistency of the U.S. government's position in the shipping conferences. At-
lantic Container Line, one of the indicted British companies, asserted that the Department of
Justice and the Federal Maritime Commission embraced views so disparate that the Justice De-
partment prosecuted despite FMC's conferral of antitrust immunity on the joint actions of the
shipping lines "through at least 15 duly approved agreements." 922 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA), at A-31 (July 12, 1979).
99 1980, c. 11. The legislation was introduced to the British House of Commons in 1979 "to
provide better protection to companies and individuals in the United Kingdom against attempts
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the first foreign statute to provide foreign defendants with the means to
recover punitive damages paid on a judgment that their government
regards as invalid for lack of jurisdiction.' °° In that sense, it is the first
foreign statute to incorporate offensive tactics against U.S. prosecutions
of extraterritorial acts. Additionally, the Act grants the Secretary of
State the authority to employ measures with extraterritorial effect in
order to regulate the compliance of parties engaged in business in the
United Kingdom.' 0 ' Thus, companies conducting business in both the
United States and Britain are more likely to be subjected to conflicting
requirements. Finally, the Act prohibits future registration and en-
forcement of all punitive judgments, in addition to certain foreign anti-
trust judgments. 02
Descriotion of the Act
The Protection of Trading Interests Act is divided into eight sec-
tions. The six substantive sections address: overseas measures affecting
British trading interests (section 1),103 documents and information re-
quired by foreign courts or authorities (section 2),10 restrictions on en-
forcement of certain overseas judgments (section 5),105 recovery of
awards of multiple damages (section 6),' ° reciprocal enforcement of
overseas judgments under provisions corresponding to section 6 (sec-
tion 7),107 and repeal of the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Docu-
ments Act of 1964 (section 8).10 8
The first four substantive sections of the Act only provide protec-
tion against foreign measures, proposed or effectuated, that are per-
ceived to infringe on Britain's commercial interests. It is ironic that the
latter two sections, however, enable the government to promote the
objectives of the Act beyond British territory.
by overseas countries to impose their domestic legislation and regulations outside their own terri-
tory." Oct. U.K. Press Notice, note I 1 supra.
100 The British government, along with the Canadian and Australian governments, believe that
the existence of prima facie activity within the forum territory is necessary to establish subject
matter jurisdiction. This view conflicts with the U.S. effects doctrine, particularly when economic
policy is involved. See Oct. U.K. Press Notice, supra note 11, Notes to Editors 4; British Diplo-
matic Note, supra note 12, at 4; [1980] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,414.
101 See text accompanying notes 161-68 infra.
102 1980, c. 11, §5.
103 Id. § 1.
104 Id. §2.
105 Id. § 5.
106 Id. §6.
107 Id. § 7.
108 Id. § 8.
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Response to Foreign Measures
Section 1 empowers the Secretary of State to affirmatively counter-
act foreign trade measures or proposals that he regards as damaging to
British commerce.' 0 9 This section is expressly applicable to a foreign
nation that makes demands of parties who are outside of its territorial
jurisdiction. I" In response, the Secretary of State may order such per-
sons to give notice of any requirement or prohibition imposed or
threatened to be imposed on them by a foreign state."' All orders of
the Secretary are to be issued in statutory form and are subject to an-
nulment by resolution of either house of Parliament.' 12
Upon receiving notice of foreign restrictions imposed on persons
engaged in commercial relations in Britain, the Secretary may direct
parties not to comply with them." 13 Directions can be tailored to pro-
hibit compliance, generally or specifically, absolutely or condition-
ally.'"' Unlike orders, which are voidable by act of Parliament,
109 Section 1 of the Act corresponds to the British Shipping and Commercial Documents Act,
1964, c. 87 (Shipping Act), which enabled the United Kingdom government to block compliance
with foreign measures or orders concerning the carriage of goods or persons by sea. See text
accompanying notes 154-58 infra.
110 Several U.S. regulatory agencies have power to take actions with extraterritorial effect. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, §§ 4-5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 44-45 (1976), empowers
the Federal Trade Commission to investigate "unfair methods of competition" in foreign com-
merce. Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission impose disclosure requirements on companies incorporated and doing busi-
ness abroad, provided they issue stock that is exchanged in the U.S. market. See Oct. U.K. Press
Notice, supra note 11, at Notes to Editors 8; Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.
1975); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
In regulating U.S. participation in ocean-shipping conferences, the Federal Maritime Com-
mission is empowered to order reports documenting any account, record, rate, or charge or any
memorandum of any facts and transactions appertaining to the business of any common carrier
subject to its jurisdiction. Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1976). Orders for documents
have long been issued to foreign carriers under the unusual jurisdiction established and initially
complied with under the U.S. Shipping Act. See Lowenfield, "To Have One's Cake. . ."-The
FederalMaritime Commission andthe Conferences, 1 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 21, 42-49 (1969). These
orders have generated much litigation and international controversy. 1d.
Although the Trading Interests Act was originally directed at the United States, it could be
applied to other countries as well, for example, the Arab states that have furthered their boycott of
Israel by imposing boycott regulations on British firms. CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(1) (general
note) (This publication is an annotation of British acts).
111 1980, c. 11, § 1(2). Although § 1 of the 1980 Trading Interests Act is modeled after the 1964
Shipping Act, the Trading Interests Act does not require parties doing business in the United
Kingdom to disclose demands made upon them by foreign governments unless the Secretary of
State takes separate statutory action to this effect. Id. § 1(2).
112 Id. § 1(4)-(5).
''3 Id. § 1(3).
114 Id. § 1(5).
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directions are completely within the discretion of the Secretary," 5 and
must only be published in such manner as the Secretary deems appro-
priate to be effective." 6 Also, they are only to be used to prohibit com-
pliance and not to ensure that authorities receive notification of foreign
requests." 7
Section 3 makes failure to comply with the orders without reason-
able excuse a violation punishable by a fine which may amount to
£ 1000 or more." Only a British citizen or a corporation incorporated
in the United Kingdom can be guilty of an offense under section 3 by
reason of any act or omission outside the United Kingdom in contra-
vention of an order. 19 Thus, the Act recognizes territorial limits to
these sanctions insofar as it relates to non-British citizens. No such ju-
risdictional limit is acknowledged, however, for British citizens, so con-
ceivably, a British company with its principal place of business in the
United States could be found in violation of these orders for complying
with certain prohibitions or requirements of U.S. law in its transactions
in France.
Restrictions on Compliance with Foreign Information Requests
Subsection 2 enables the Secretary to prohibit persons in Britain
from complying with certain orders of a foreign court, tribunal or au-
thority to produce or to publish commercial information which is not
within the territorial jurisdiction of the mandating country. 20 The Sec-
retary's authority may be exercised in anticipation of an inadmissible
foreign order, as well. 2 ' A foreign order is inadmissible if the Secre-
tary decides that the request should be refused under any of the several
115 Apparently the Secretary's authority to issue directions is limited to measures which are the
subject of a notification order, issued under subsection (2). CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(1)
(general note).
116 1980, c. 11, § 1(5). Only "general directions need be published, according to subsection (5),
yet no distinction is drawn in the statute between "specific" and "general" directions.
117 Id. § 1(4).
118 Id. § 3(1)(a). This section permits a fine of any amount to be imposed upon indictment.
Upon summary conviction, the penalty is a fine, that is not to exceed the sum prescribed for
England and Wales under the Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 28, and, for Scotland, under the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1975, c. 21, § 289(d). The sum presently set by these statutes
is £1000, but it may be raised according to changes in currency valuation.119 1980, c. 11, § 3(2).
120 Id. § 2(l)(a)-(b). This provision is directed at the wide range of evidence that may be sub-
poenaed under U.S. discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976). Either parties or witnesses
may be subjected to subpoenas from an American court to supply information held by them, or
their controlled subsidiaries abroad.
121 1980, c. 11, § 2(1)(a)-(b).
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grounds contained in subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), (3)(a) or (3)(b). 122
Under subsection (2), a request will be inadmissible:
(a) if it infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise
prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom; or (b) if compli-
ance with the requirement would be prejudicial to the security of the
United Kingdom or to the relations of the government of the United
Kingdom with the government of any other county. 123
Subsection (3) specifies that unless the information is to be used in civil
or criminal proceedings which have been instituted in the overseas
country, it will not be furnished if the Secretary so directs.'24 A foreign
request is also inadmissible under subsection (3) if it orders a party to
declare which documents relevant to these proceedings are or have
been within that party's control, or to produce documents other than
those specified in the order.'25 Although section 2 generally is framed
in terms of requirements imposed by foreign authorities, subsection 5
explains that a request or demand will be considered to be compelled if
it was made in circumstances in which a requirement could be or could
have been imposed. 126
If the foreign order is characterized as inadmissible under any of
the above subsections, the Secretary may issue directions forbidding
compliance with the request. Any person who knowingly contravenes
the Secretary's directions under 2(1) not to comply will be guilty of an
offense. 127 To be convicted of violating subsection 1(3) or 2(1), a party
must have had knowledge of the direction.' 28 Since a direction is effec-
tive upon publication, 129 unless knowledge were a pre-requisite for
conviction, parties in Britain would be unfairly exposed to liability.
Proceedings to enforce the provisions of section 3 are to be instituted by
the Secretary of State or with the consent of the Attorney General.
30
Section 4 announces that section 2 of the Evidence (Proceedings in
122 Id. §§ 2-3.
123 Id. § 2(2)(a)-(b).
124 The statute does not define when proceedings will be deemed to be "instituted," although
any foreign procedure for pre-action discovery would be inapplicable to persons under British
jurisdiction based on § 2(3)(b).
125 Id. § 2(3)(b).
126 Thus, the Secretary of State may prohibit a person from voluntarily complying with an
unenforceable request from a foreign court. Even a request to supply evidence is considered to be
an order to produce that evidence. This subsection prohibits compliance with foreign orders to
disclose evidence to persons other than the ordering authority, for example, to another party to the
foreign proceedings. CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(2) (general note, subs. (5)).
127 1980, c. 11, § 3(l).
128 Id. § 3.
129 Id. § 2(4).
130 Id. § 3(3).
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Other Jurisdictions) Act is to be read consistently with the Protection of
Trading Interests Act to bar compliance with a foreign court's requests
for information that the Secretary of State has certified as prejudicial to
British sovereignty.' 3 ' This ensures that litigants invoking either act
will be accorded the same treatment.
Non-Registrability of Foreign Judgments
Section 5 blocks registration of any foreign judgment for multiple
damages or any foreign judgment based on a provision or rule of law
which appears to the Secretary of State to be concerned with the prohi-
bition or regulation of restraints on competition. 132 Similarly, the sec-
tion bars registration of any judgment on a claim for contribution to a
multiple damage award or any antitrust judgment. 133 Registration is a
prerequisite to enforcement. Therefore, this section effectively inhibits
recovery in the United Kingdom on any foreign judgment within its
ambit. 134 Discretion rests with the Secretary of State as to what consti-
tutes an anti-competition law. Subsection (4) indicates, however, that
laws concerned with the regulation of agreements, arrangements or
practices designed to restrain or distort competition in business, qual-
ify.'3 1 Since the Secretary's decision may provoke serious political
repercussions, an order issued pursuant to this subsection is subject to
annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament.13 6
Recovery of Multiple Damages
The last two substantive sections of the Act are unprecedented and
131 See text accompanying notes 211-23 infra.
132 1980, c. 11, § 5(1). A foreign judgment for multiple damages, "arrived at by doubling,
trebling or otherwise multiplying a sum assessed as compensation," is automatically barred from
registration. Id. § 5(3). A judgment based on a provision or rule of law regulating competition in
business will only be unregistrable if the Secretary of State considers the law supporting the judg-
ment to fall within the category of anticompetition laws. Id. § 5(4). Additionally, the Secretary's
designation of such a law must be approved by Parliament. Id. § 5(5).
133 Id. § 5(2). This section recognizes that United States courts acknowledge a right of contri-
bution between joint defendants to an antitrust action. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v.
National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
134 Even the compensatory part of a damage award is unrecoverable in the United Kingdom if
the judgment was premised on a foreign competition law. The statute, thus, supercedes the com-
mon law right to sue on final judgments. No action need be taken by the Secretary of State for the
specified judgments to be prohibited from recognition or enforcement since the bar in this section
is absolute. 1980, c. 11, § 5(1).
135 The general description of antitrust laws in subsection (4) is based on article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome, which defines anticompetition law for the European Economic Community.
Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
136 1980, c. 11, § 5(5).
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extremely provocative. Their aim is to undercut multiple damage
awards. 137 Section 6, dubbed the "claw back" provision,138 entitles cer-
tain qualifying defendants to recover any noncompensatory damages
paid to a victorious plaintiff in a foreign court. 139 If full payment has
not yet been made by the defendant, he is entitled to recover that pro-
portion of the amount paid that is equivalent to the proportion of the
judgment that exceeded actual damages.' 4° Thus, if a defendant is ad-
judged liable for treble damages but pays only one-half of the total
award, recovery under section 6 would be for two-thirds of the one-half
sum paid or one-third of the total award.
4 1
Citizens of the United Kingdom, British corporations, and persons
carrying on business in Britain are all entitled to recover under this
section.' 42 Section 6 excepts from its coverage, "an individual who was
ordinarily resident in the overseas country at the time when the pro-
ceedings in which the judgment was given were instituted or a body
corporate which had its principal place of business there at that
time." 143 Additionally, recovery is not available "where the qualifying
defendant carried on business in the overseas country and the proceed-
ings in which the judgment was given were concerned with activities
carried on exclusively in that country."'" Proceedings under this sec-
tion may be heard by a British court notwithstanding that the person
against whom the proceedings are brought is outside the court's juris-
diction. 41 Judgments entered before the passage of this Act are not
eligible for the provisions of section 6.146
In the final stage of amendment to the Bill, the House of Lords
added a subsection (7), which applied the recovery provisions to any
order made by a tribunal or authority of an overseas country that
would, if that tribunal were a court, be a judgment for multiple dam-
ages within the broad definition in section 5.147 This modification per-
mits recovery from decisions rendered by the European Economic
137 See Dec. U.K. Press Notice, note 29 supra; CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(5)-(6) (general
notes).
138 See 302 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), at C-4 (Apr. 8, 1980).
139 1980, c. 11, § 6(2). See 9 INT'L PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK I (1980); Baker, supra note 29,
at 24.
140 1980, c. 11, § 6(2).
141 Any execution obtained by the plaintiff against the assets of a qualifying defendant is in-
cluded within the amount the defendant is deemed to have paid. 1980, c. 11, § 6(6).
142 Id. § 6(1).
143 Id. § 6(3).
144 Id. § 6(4) (emphasis added).
145 Id. § 6(5).
146 Id. § 6(8).
147 Id. § 6(7). See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(6) (general note).
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Community (EEC) under the Rome Treaty.148 More importantly, this
subsection ensures that the Act will not be circumvented by a U.S. ad-
ministrative agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
or the Federal Maritime Commission, that renders a decision within
the ambit of the statute.'
49
Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Recovery Provisions
As an incentive for other countries to adopt legislation permitting
the recovery of noncompensatory foreign judgments, Parliament pro-
vided in section 7 for the enforcement in Britain of recovery orders
issued under any corresponding foreign law.150 This provision is pre-
mised on Parliament's perception that the comparable foreign law will
permit judgments rendered under section 6 to be enforced in the for-
eign country.15' Although recovery is obviously dependent upon
whether any assets of the winning plaintiff are within the jurisdiction of
the court, reciprocal enforcement of these judgments makes recovery
more likely for the qualifying defendant who brings an action under
section 6 or a foreign facsimile. Thus, the more countries with similar
legislation, the more effective will be a judgment in any one of them.
Section 7 requires a separate parliamentary decree to implement the
reciprocity clause with respect to each country.'
5 2
Repeal of the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents 4ct
Section 8 defines some terms used within the Trading Interests
Act,'53 in addition to repealing the Shipping Contracts and Commer-
148 Art. 15 of Council Regulation No. 17, Reglement No. 17: Premier reglement d'application
des articles 85 et 86 du traite, 5 J.O. CoMM. EUR. 204 (1962), enables the Commission of the EEC
to impose fines for infringement of articles 85(1) or 86, the anticompetition rules of the EEC.
Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. These fines can amount to up
to 10% of the revenues of the preceding year for each of the parties participating in the infringe-
ment. Id. A qualifying British defendant seeking to take advantage of § 6 of the 1980 Act will
encounter a conflict between Britain's obligations as an EEC member, and the literal provisions of
the 1980 statute. Community law is binding on Britain yet § 6 does not explicitly except anticom-
petition fines enacted by the EEC from the bases for recovery.
149 See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11 (introductory general note).
150 1980, c. 11, § 7. This section was amended to the bill during the Report stage in the House
of Lords. The Parliamentary record reveals that other countries are considering a provision simi-
lar to § 6. See 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 949 (1979); 980 PARL. Dn., H.C. (5th ser.) 649
(1979); [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,414.
151 [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,414.
152 1980, c. 11, § 7(l).
153 For example, the term "overseas country" means, according to section 8(2), "any country or
territory outside the United Kingdom other than one for whose international relations Her Maj-
esty's Government in the United Kingdom are responsible." According to section 8(3),
"[r]eferences. . .to the law or a court, tribunal or authority of an overseas country includes, in the
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cial Documents Act of 1964 (Shipping Act).' 54 In several respects, that
statute was the precursor to the Trading Interests Act. The Shipping
Act constituted an early attempt to inhibit U.S. efforts to regulate,
through the Federal Maritime Commission, the international carriage
of goods.'55 The Shipping Act also restricted the production of docu-
ments sought by foreign authorities or courts.'5 6 Authority similar to
that presently delegated to the Secretary of State by the Trading Inter-
ests Act was delegated under the Shipping Act to "any Minister of the
Crown."' 57 Moreover, a fine of up to £1000 was provided for willful
failure to comply with statutory orders or for contravention of any di-
rections issued under the Shipping Act.'58
EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The Trading Interests Act reflects the government's frustration
with both the undaunted continuation of U.S. extraterritorial enforce-
ment practices and its own past inability to protect British citizens or
parties conducting business in Britain from prosecution under U.S.
laws.' 59 The provisions of the statute have two objectives. First, they
offer shelter from certain past vulnerabilities. One example is section 6,
which entitles defendants to recover in Britain for punitive damages
paid on a foreign judgment under an anticompetition law.' 60 Second,
the provisions anticipate potential disputes and equip the Secretary of
State to respond. For example, the first section of the Act confers
broad power on the Secretary to decide when parties in Britain should
be ordered not to comply with foreign laws that exceed their territorial
jurisdiction. 16  Overall, the Act will motivate the U.S. government to
case of a federal state, references to the law or a court, tribunal, or authority of any constituent
part of that country." Thus, the Act will apply to U.S. state court decisions as well as those of the
U.S. federal courts.
154 1980, c. 11, § 7(5)-(6). Although the Shipping Act, 1964, c. 87, is repealed, subsection (6)
preserves the effect of any directions given under that Act prior to the passage of the Trading
Interests Act. Only one direction was issued pursuant to the 1964 Act: the Shipping Contracts
(Foreign Measures) Order, 1968, STAT. INST. No. 1382, regarding the U.S. Federal Maritime
Commission's order against the North Atlantic Westbound Freight Association. CURRENT L.
STAT., 1980, c. 11(8) (general note).
155 See Baker, supra note 29, at 24.
156 1964, c. 87, § 1(2).
157 Id. § 2(1). Under this subsection, any Minister may give directions prohibiting any person
in the United Kingdom from complying with any foreign court order to produce extraterritorially
located commercial documents.
158 Id. § 3(l).
159 See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11 (introductory general note); [1979] 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 1 50,416; Dec. U.K. Press Notice, note 29 supra.
160 See text accompanying notes 244-64 infra.
161 See text accompanying notes 109-19 supra.
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negotiate its differences, and will encourage U.S. courts to pay heed to
considerations of comity.
The combined effect of the reactive and prospective provisions on
efforts to prosecute British defendants is likely to be substantial. Pri-
vate litigants are especially vulnerable to the statute's provisions since,
even if they win their case, any noncompensatory damages they receive
are subject to a set-off against any assets they may have in the United
Kingdom or other countries subscribing to the reciprocity notion of
section 7.162 Both private and government cases will find discovery of
foreign documents greatly impeded. An official in the Justice Depart-
ment expressed concern that future cases will be adjudicated without
the advantage of comprehensive discovery, which will presumably im-
pair justice. 163
A number of U.S. statutes besides the antitrust laws may be frus-
trated by the new British Act. The United States has embraced a non-
territorial conception of jurisdiction and many important laws reflect
this view.' 6  As an example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 165
which prohibits bribery of foreign officials for the purpose of inducing
a preference for the goods or services of the bribing company, would
cover a foreign subsidiary acting as an agent of its U.S. parent. 166 Al-
though British and American interests would seem to correspond where
a U.S. subsidiary in Britain was suspected of bribing a British official to
influence government procurement, Britain may resent U.S. efforts to
stem corruption when it involves actions within Britain by British citi-
zens. Thus, section 1 might be invoked to block compliance with docu-
mentary requests by the United States. That section is sufficiently
open-ended to make its application conjectural. 67 Regardless of the
162 Britain is more concerned with private antitrust suits than with government suits for two
reasons. First, only private litigants are eligible for multiple damage awards under the Clayton
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Second, in private suits, foreign governments do not receive notice
prior to commencement of the suit, as they do before government initiated litigation. See note 31
supra; Stanford, note 37 supra.
163 Baker, supra note 10, at 187.
164 For discussion of the expansive jurisdictional view held by the United States, as compared
to other countries' restrictive views, see Stanford, supra note 37, at 203.
165 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1979) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78ff (1976)).
166 To fall within the parameters of the Act, a foreign subsidiary must act in behalf ofa domes-
tic company and make corrupt use of interstate commerce in furtherance of a bribe. The Act
requires more than merely the Alcoa proof of "substantial effects" to justify the extraterritorial
extension of its provisions. Id.
167 The Secretary of State may act under § I if the foreign measure, insofar as it applies to the
extraterritorial activities of persons conducting business in the United Kingdom, damages or
threatens to damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom. The foreign measure need not
infringe upon the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom before § 1 applies. The Secretary of State
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section's actual use, it clearly informs the United States that the British
intend to assert their jurisdictional authority more aggressively than in
the past.' 6
8
Section 1. Protection Against Overseas Measures
Problems of Concurrent Jurisdiction. As Britain acts under section 1 to
block compliance with U.S. requests or prohibitions, companies doing
business in Britain are more likely to find themselves violating the law
of either one sovereign or the other. One could hypothesize an alleged
infraction of the anti-boycott provisions of the U.S. Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979 (EAA) 169 by a wholly owned British subsidiary of a
U.S. corporation which agrees to a letter of credit containing a require-
ment prohibited by that Act. The Export Administration Act applies to
United States persons, a category which may encompass controlled for-
eign subsidiaries.170 Although an exception to the EAA's coverage per-
mits a United States resident in a foreign country to comply with the
laws of that foreign country when importing certain goods into that
country alone, 17' deference to the foreign sovereign is very limited and
depends upon the existence of a countermanding foreign law.172 Con-
ceivably, if a country has a public policy supporting certain business
practices, but this policy is not enacted into law, the exception to the
EAA would not inure. Thus, if the U.S. subsidiary comports with the
EAA by disclosing to Treasury Department officials an unlawful for-
eign request, it may be in violation of British law, if the British Secre-
tary of State has directed noncompliance with foreign document
disclosure requirements.
has broad discretion as to how to implement the Act. See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. I1(1)
(general note).
168 Id., at C. 11 (introductory general note); Baker, supra note 29, at 24.
169 Export Administration Act of 1979, § 8, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (Supp. 1 1979). The anti-
boycott provisions of the Export Administration Act prohibit any United States person from com-
plying with any boycott imposed by a foreign country against a country that is not the object of a
U.S. boycott. Id. Moreover, the President is directed to issue regulations requiring any U.S. per-
son who receives a request for information which would aid a foreign boycott to report that fact to
the Secretary of State. Id. The British Secretary of Trade may find any such restriction or report-
ing requirement imposed upon a company conducting business in Britain to be an invasion of
British sovereignty.
170 Section 16, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415 (Supp. 11979). See Hacking, The Increasing Extraterrito-
rial Impact of U.S. Laws: A4 Cause For Concern Amongst Friends ofAmerica, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1, 6-7 (1978).
171 Section 8(a)(2)(F), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (Supp. 1 1979).
172 Id. The exception applies only to imports of trademarked, trade named, or similarly specif-
ically identifiable products, or components of products manufactured for the use of U.S. persons
abroad.
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Foreign Governmental Compulsion Defense. Another ramification of a
section 1 order is that it could serve as the basis for a foreign govern-
mental compulsion defense in a United States court. Foreign govern-
mental compulsion is one of several affirmative defenses frequently
raised against subject matter jurisdiction.'73 To sustain this defense, a
party must show that the conduct in question was compelled under the
foreign law as it existed at the time of the alleged offense, and not
merely permitted or encouraged. 174 Moreover, the conduct must have
occurred within the territory of the foreign sovereign.'7 5 In the past,
defendants have had difficulty prevailing with this defense.176 The Jus-
tice Department has urged that the sovereign compulsion doctrine be
strictly construed so that the Department may "carry out its essential
function of protecting the competitiveness of U.S. markets and export
opportunities."' 177 Yet in certain situations, the fact of a government
compelled action, attested to by the British Secretary of State's statu-
tory order, may suffice to insulate defendants from prosecution under
U.S. law. 178
International Comity. Even if a court is not persuaded by a defense of
foreign governmental compulsion, an order under section 1 would bear
on considerations of international comity. 179 Until the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 180 defendants
were only infrequently able to persuade the courts to balance the com-
peting interests of the implicated foreign nation with those of the
173 Antitrust litigation on foreign activities often involves a foreign compulsion defense. See
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 7-8; see, e.g., In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
174 ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 54-55. See Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 1291, 1296-99 (D. Del. 1970).
175 ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 54-55. See Stan-
ford, supra note 37, at 203.
176 See Stanford, supra note 37, at 203.
177 ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 8.
178 See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. II (introductory general note). Cf. Restatement Note, note
21 supra (This author argues that a U.S. court should not defer to foreign interests merely because
the foreign country has made compliance with an American law a criminal offense.).
179 United States laws that have an extraterritorial effect make international clashes over con-
current jurisdiction more likely. Comity, the concept of one sovereign's modification of its own
interests to accommodate those of another sovereign, has been increasingly endorsed by U.S. offi-
dals. See Bell, note 49 supra; Antitrust Realism, supra note 8, at 8. Recently, the Justice Depart-
ment's sensitivity toward U.S. court decisions that fail to take sufficient account of foreign
governmental concerns was reflected in a formal statement to the district court judge in the West-
inghouse uranium litigation. See note 64 supraP ut see Shifrin, note 18 spra.
tao 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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United States.' 8 ' In Timberlane, the court concluded that the effects
test alone was inadequate to resolve whether extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion should be asserted since it ignores the interests of foreign na-
tions.'8M The court instead proposed a tripartite analysis, including the
usual "effect doctrine" inquiry, an inquiry as to the extent of the al-
leged violation, and an inquiry as to the magnitude of the effect on
American foreign commerce.18 3 In utilizing this approach, the courts
have paid greater heed to statutes than to judge-made rules of law or to
governmental policy statements.' 84 One incidental result has been to
encourage foreign countries to pass legislation in anticipation of or re-
action to U.S. litigation. t 5 By passing the Trading Interests Act, Brit-
ain has attempted to influence a U.S. court's evaluation of the comity
interests involved.8 6 Even with the existence of a countermanding for-
eign law, however, at least some American courts will not hesitate to
reach decisions that place the foreign defendant in a position of crimi-
nal liability."8 7 Most recently, in the Westinghouse litigation, the Dis-
trict Court of the Northern District of Illinois rejected the need to
balance the national interests of the United States and the foreign
countries involved to determine which interests predominated before it
ordered production of documents, disclosure of which would violate
certain foreign laws.' Judge Marshall asserted:
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even
authority, to evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign coun-
try, such a balancing test is inherently unworkable in this case. The com-
181 See id. at 612 & nn.24-25.
182 Id. at 611-12; see Note, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.: A Further Step Toward
a Complete Subject Matter Jurisdiction Test, 2 Nw. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 241, 243 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Mannington Note].
183 549 F.2d at 613.
184 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); American
Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (holding that
the strong public policy behind U.S. antitrust laws demanded certain information be produced
despite foreign blocking laws, and without considering countermanding foreign policy interests).
Part of the reason why U.S. courts take a narrow view of foreign laws is that they have responsi-
bility for inquiring into the legislative intent of and other non-statutory influences on U.S. laws
but are not concomitantly empowered, nor best suited, to probe the motives underlying a foreign
country's laws. For comment on the dissent in In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Con-
tracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) which criticized the majority for not looking be-
hind the relevant Canadian statute, see TEx. INT'L L.J., supra note 70, at 479-80.
185 See Stanford, supra note 37, at 204-06.
186 See [1980] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,414.
187 See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Rio Algom, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Uranium Anti-
trust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ili. 1979). Cf. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (attempting to weigh competing national inter-
ests using the Rogers rule).
188 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
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peting interests here display an irreconcilable conffict on precisely the
same plane of national policy. . . .It is simply impossible to judicially
'balance' these totally contradictory and mutually negating actions.1 89
Although the doctrine of comity was revitalized in Timberlane, it
remains ambiguous and difficult to apply.19 Furthermore, its use has
been largely limited to the stage at which sanctions are imposed, and
the doctrine has not been widely accepted as a determinative or sub-
stantial factor when the court decides whether or not to exercise its
jurisdiction.19' Thus, even if parties who are subject to section 1 of the
Trading Interests Act buttress their comity arguments by pointing to
the British Secretary of State's order, this argument may not be heard
until the defendants have been held in default for refusing compliance
and sanctions are considered.1 92 Some courts have refrained, however,
from ordering sanctions against parties who did not comply with U.S.
law since compliance would have made them liable under a foreign
law. 193
Thus, section 1 permits the British government to do more than
merely command parties subject to its jurisdiction not to comply with
extraterritorial requirements imposed on them by foreign authorities.
If these parties are sued for noncompliance or related actions, a section
1 order will contribute to the persuasiveness of a foreign governmental
compulsion defense as well as an argument that, because vital foreign
policy is implicated, considerations of comity should stay a U.S. court's
assertion of jurisdiction, or failing that, any imposition of sanctions.
Sections 2, 3 and 4: Restrictions on Compliance with Foreign
Information Requests
Together, sections 2, 3 and 4 modify prior law governing coopera-
tion with foreign courts and authorities on documents and information
needed for civil or criminal proceedings. First, these new provisions
make clear that the nature of foreign documentary requests as well as
their stated purpose will come under stricter scrutiny than heretofore
189 Id.
190 Id See generally Foreign Disclosure Note, note 10 supra; Discovery Note, note 27 supra.
191 See Socidt6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); In re Uranium Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1144-47 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
192 Id See Westinghouse v. Rio Algom, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
193 See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992, 998-99
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). In First Natl
City Bank, the Second Circuit stated that on the basis of comity, U.S. courts should not take
action that could force a party to violate the laws of other sovereign states. Id. at 901. See gener-
ally Bell, note 49 supra; Manningon Note, note 182 supra.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:476(1980)
both by British courts and by the Secretary of State. 194 Access to
materials sought other than as evidence in criminal or civil proceedings
that have already been instituted will be denied.195 Second, the deter-
mination not to permit the foreign request is no longer primarily made
by the courts since the Secretary is empowered under section 2 to direct
parties not to comply with requirements deemed "inadmissible."' 196
Third, the criteria of inadmissibility are expanded to encompass possi-
ble injury to British trade relations with other countries, 197 while main-
taining the previous concerns with security and infringement on
sovereignty. 198 Fourth, unlike the Evidence Act, which applies only to
discovery pursuant to letters rogatory, 199 section 2 of the new Act ap-
plies to "any request or a demand for the supply of a document or
information which, pursuant to the requirement of any court, tribunal
or authority of an overseas country, is addressed to a person in the
United Kingdom .. ."' Thus, personal service of requests is within
the scope of the Act, implicating the provisions of 28 U.SC. § 1783,2"1
which address the service of subpoenas on an American citizen or resi-
dent located in a foreign country, and Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,20 2 addressing the taking of depositions in foreign
countries.
Finally, these sections exempt certain parties from the offenses
they formulate. "A person who is neither a citizen of the United King-
dom and Colonies nor a body corporate incorporated in the United
Kingdom" cannot be compelled to ignore trade measures imposed by
foreign countries or information requested by foreign authorities, if
that compliance occurs outside the United Kingdom. 20 3 The express
exemption from liability under the Act for non-British citizens who
comply with foreign policies implies that British citizens are not simi-
larly exempted for their actions outside British territory.2 0 In this
194 See text accompanying notes 218-23 infra.
195 1980, c. 11, § 2(3)(a).
196 Id. § 2.
197 Id. § 2(2).
198 See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(3); Shipping Con-
tracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87, § 2(l)(b).
199 Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 1.
200 1980, c. 11, § 2(5). This section amends the provisions of the Shipping Act, which did not
cover documents or evidence sought through letters rogatory.
201 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976). See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(2) (general note). Under
§ 1783, a U.S. court is not permitted to subpoena the attendance or response of foreign citizens or
residents. See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
202 FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
203 1980, c. 11, § 3(2).
204 See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(3) (general note).
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event, the Act claims personal jurisdiction based on both territorial and
national factors, the latter being one characteristic of many United
States laws that the British deplore.
211
Despite the innovations and modifications of sections 2 and 3,
these sections merely transfer the authority and expand the coverage of
the 1964 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act. 0 6
Under the Shipping Act, which is superceded by section 8(5) of the
Protection of Trading Interests Act,2 0 7 any Minister could issue direc-
tions prohibiting compliance with foreign documentary require-
ments.20 8  The Shipping Act focused on preventing release of
information to foreign authorities that could or would constitute an in-
fringement of the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.20 9 The Act of-
fered no specific protection of Britain's international commercial
interests as does the Trading Interests Act. 10 Where documentary re-
quests were made by overseas courts or authorities, using letters roga-
tory in pursuance of instituted civil or criminal proceedings, or
contemplated civil proceedings, the 1975 Evidence Act prevailed.2 1
The new Act combines provisions relevant to both of these older Acts
and consolidates authority for its effectuation under the Secretary of
State. This consolidation ensures that Britain's foreign policy is consid-
ered before information is released to foreign courts or authorities.
The combined effect of sections 2, 3 and 4 is likely to alter the
perspective of courts in the United Kingdom toward the release of
commercial information to foreign courts. Section 2 essentially codifies
the House of Lords' holding on the Evidence Act in Rio Tinto Zinc v.
Westinghouse,21 2 however, so that a change in court attitude probably
would have occurred even without that section. In Rio Tinto Zinc, a
case of first impression under the Evidence Act, the English Court of
Appeal rejected the old case law as inapposite and declared that pre-
trial discovery would be freely allowed.21 3 The House of Lords, how-
ever, reinvoked the historical bar against the release of information
205 See Sept. U.K. Press Notice, note 12 supra (speech of John Nott).
206 Subsections 2 and 3 of section I of the Shipping Act are reenacted in the Trading Interests
Act, although with several changes.
207 1980, c. 11, § 8(5).
208 1964, c. 87, § 2.
209 Id See Baker, supra note 29, at 24.
210 1964, c. 87, § 2. See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(2) (general note).
211 See Discovery Note, note 27 supra.
212 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 87-90,
[1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 441-43 (H.L. 1977).
213 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977) (opinion of Lord Wilberforce).
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sought merely because it might lead to the discovery of other informa-
tion that would be relevant at trial.214
The literal wording of the Evidence Act allowed a British court to
secure information for a requesting foreign court even before proceed-
ings were instituted.215 As long as civil proceedings were "contem-
plated," a court could grant letters rogatory.216 In the past, British
courts had summarily refused requests by U.S. courts for assistance in
the production of pretrial discovery.217
Once it was decided that the Evidence Act would be read to limit
discovery to material evidence,218 the Lords then concluded, by a three
to two vote, that they should look beyond the phrasing of the letters
rogatory to the substance of the request and the circumstances in which
they were issued.2 19 The courts are directed, thus, to predict the ulti-
mate purpose of the request. This inquiry may further impede access
by foreign litigants to information in Britain. Moreover, the Lords
stated that in matters of longtime government policy, the courts should
speak "with the same voice as the executive. ' 220  Lord Wilberforce
commented in reference to the U.S. Justice Department's intervention:
[I]f public interest enters into this matter on one side, so it must be taken
account of on the other; and as the views of the executive in the United
States of America impel the making of the getters rogatory] order, so
must the views of the executive in the United Kingdom be considered
when it is a question of implementing the order here. It is axiomatic that
in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to defend what it is the
policy of another state to attack.2 2 '
With that comment, Lord Wilberforce signalled that the courts
would and, in fact, should further the policies of the British govern-
ment. Apparently, Parliament wanted an additional safeguard for its
214 Id.
215 Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34 § l(b).
216 Id.
217 See [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 86-87. Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618
(1955) is the leading case on point. In this case, the court refused to comply with a request from a
U.S. court for documents from parties not involved in the suit. The request was rejected on the
basis that the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. 619, c. 113, § 1, allowed pro-
duction only of evidence to be used at trial, and did not allow production for the purpose of pre-
trial discovery.
218 fd. at 101.
219 Id. at 118-19. The U.S. Department of Justice had offered the British appellants immunity
from government prosecution based on their requested testimony. Text accompanying notes 49-
52 supra. The House of Lords viewed the Justice Department's intercession in a case initiated by
private parties as an indication that the requested tesitmony might be used for more than the
evidentiary purpose expressed in the Westinghouse letters rogatory. [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 115.
220 [19781 2 W.L.R. at 94.
221 Id.
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policies since it empowered the Secretary of State, under the Trading
Interests Act, to prohibit compliance with foreign requests that are
prejudicial to British sovereignty, security, or international relations.222
Not only are the lower courts to follow the British High Court's admo-
nition to scrutinize foreign requests for their underlying purpose, but
they are directed to employ expanded standards of inadmissibility. In
the future, foreign parties can anticipate a cautious approach by courts
to letters rogatory and other demands for information.223
Sections 5, 6 and 7 Prohibitions Against Registration and Recovery of
Judgments for Punitive Damages
Sections 5,224 6,225 and 7226 form Britain's new offensive against
United States extraterritorial jurisdiction. Whereas the preceding sec-
tions of the Act resemble nondisclosure statutes previously adopted in
many foreign countries, sections 5, 6, and 7 are unprecedented.227
These sections affect the judgment and post-judgment phases of litiga-
tion rather than the discovery or evidence-gathering phase, which was
the focus of most previous blocking statutes.228 Britain's enactment of
major restrictions on recognition and enforcement of certain kinds of
foreign judgments serves as a sound political rebuke to the United
States, coming at a time when the United States-United Kingdom Con-
vention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil Matters is in draft form and under negotiation.229 Moreover,
222 1980, c. 11, § 2(2).
223 For a discussion of the different concepts of jurisdiction recognized by Britain and the
United States, see text accompanying notes 1-12, supra.
224 1980, c. 11, § 5.
225 Id. § 6.
226 Id. § 7.
227 See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(5)-(7) (general notes).
228 Only the Australian Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, 1979,
No. 13 (Austl.), antedated the Trading Interests Act's prohibitions on registration and enforce-
ment of multiple damage judgments. The Australian Act is, however, much less ambitious than
the British Act in attempting to thwart U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Australian Attorney
General is only authorized to proscribe the registration of antitrust judgments that he deems detri-
mental or likely to be detrimental to Australia's trade interests.
Additionally, the Australian Act permits the Attorney General merely to limit the enforce-
ability of any foreign antitrust judgment so that a treble damage award might be ordered enforce-
able in Australia for a sum substantially less than was decided by the foreign court. 1979, No. 13,
§ 3 (Austl.).
229 Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters,
draft initialed Oct. 26, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
As 71 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reciprocal Convention]. See generaly Smit, The Proposed
United States- United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Proto-
typefor the Future, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977). This Convention followed the Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened/or sig-
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the letter, although perhaps not the spirit, of sections 5 and 6 extends
beyond punitive judgments in antitrust suits: any judgment for multi-
ple damages is potentially recoverable.230 Section 5 expressly prohibits
the registration and enforcement of any foreign judgment for multiple
damages.23' This could encompass a judgment in which the underlying
action was in tort or trademark infringement. Furthermore, section 6,
by allowing any "person carrying on business in the United Kingdom"
to recover,232 entitles individuals with potentially limited ties to Britain
to recover under this provision. Thus, this landmark statute is not only
broad in its coverage and unprecedented in its likely effect on certain
foreign judgments rendered against Biitish defendants, but it is also of
substantial advantage to non-British parties who are merely carrying
on business in the United Kingdom.
Finally, and most significantly, sections 6 and 7 directly challenge
the system of U.S. private antitrust prosecutions. Specifically, by enti-
tling a British national, a British corporation, or a person conducting
business in the United Kingdom to recover the noncompensatory por-
tion of a judgment for multiple damages paid in the United States, the
British Act undermines the treble damages incentive to private attor-
neys general provided by the Clayton Act. Generally, this new ap-
proach is a result of frustration with the limited effectiveness of other
defensive statutes legislated in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.233
For example, by merely restricting access to documents required by
U.S. plaintiffs, Britain has not significantly deterred private or public
suits against parties under British sovereignty.234 Therefore, sections 5,
6, and 7 take broad aim and contain some powerful incentives for the
United States government to re-evaluate its extraterritorial enforce-
ment policies and statutes.
U. S. - U.K Convention on the Reciorocal Recognition and Enforcement of
nature Sept. 27, 1968, 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 299) 32 (1972), translated in [1973] 2 COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 6003 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1973). The 1973 Convention is an agreement
among the members of the European Economic Community to honor judgments rendered in any
member state against a non-member defendant. Thus, a civil or commercial decision of a British
court against a U.S. defendant would be recognizable in Germany. The EEC Convention makes
the enforcement of judgments possible in a greater number of jurisdictions than previously.
230 1980, c. 11, § 5(2)(a). See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(5) (general note).
231 CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(5) (general note).
232 1980, c.l1, § 6(1)(c).
233 For a list of the past foreign enactments that employed defensive measures, see note 13
supra.
234 In fact, the number of both private and public antitrust suits brought against foreign de-
fendants has increased in the past few years. See Rahl, Antitrust and International Transactions-
Recent Developments, 46 ANTITRUsT L.J. 965, 965 (1978); Shifrin, note 17 supra.
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Judgments in Civil Matters. That the United Kingdom would prohibit
the registration and enforcement of multiple damages is no surprise.
What is surprising, however, is that in the midst of bilateral negotia-
tions with the United States, Britain has taken unilateral action espe-
cially targeted at U.S. judgments. In October 1976, the United States
and the United Kingdom initialed the draft of the Convention on the
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Mat-
ters.235 Both nations agreed that judgments for punitive or multiple
damages would be excluded from coverage.2 36 This provision is in ad-
dition to article 7(a), which permits nonrecogntion when recognition
would be manifestly repugnant to local public policy.2 37 Because the
United States abandoned consideration of the registration of multiple
damage judgments in order to advance the negotiation of a complete
Convention package, Britain's unilateral enactment of this provision
appears to be in bad faith. Additionally, the United States is discon-
certed by the substance of section 5 of the Act, which bars registration
of certain judgments, since it does not correspond to what was agreed
upon in the Convention.23
Inclusion of Non-Antitrust Laws. The real sting of section 5 is not so
much that the registration of multiple damage judgments is prohibited,
but that the registration or enforcement of any antitrust decision or
other judgment arising out of the regulation of competition may also be
barred.23 9 A final order rendered under one of the restraint of trade
laws need not award punitive damages to be ineligible for registra-
235 See note 229 supra.
236 Reciprocal Convention, supra note 229, Art. 2(2)(b); see Smit, supra note 229, at 448.
237 Reciprocal Convention, supra note 229, Art. 7(a).
238 See Dec. U.K. Press Notice, supra note 29, at 4. In a diplomatic note dated November 9,
1979, and addressed to the British Secretary of State for Trade, the United States Ambassador to
Great Britain strongly criticized the provisions of clause 5 which were ultimately enacted in § 5.
In particular, the U.S. Ambassador remarked that unlike the negotiated draft of the Convention
on Reciprocal Recognition of Judgments, clause 5 did not contemplate enforcement of the com-
pensatory portion of a multiple damage award. This inconsistency was partially rectified in
amendments to the Protection of Trading Interests Bill, but § 6 enables pro rata recovery. Assum-
ing that treble damages are awarded in the United States, if the defendant does not pay the full
judgment, but is entitled to recover two-thirds of whatever is paid, the winning plaintiff would be
left with less than full compensation. Of course, this hypothetical assures that the plaintiff has
sufficient recoverable assets that are available to the qualifying defendant in Britain. Further-
more, § 5 bars recognition and hence, enforcement of judgments that presumably would have
been honored under the Convention on Reciprocal Recognition of Judgments. For example, a
judgment based on a rule of law specified by the Secretary of State is unenforceable under
§ 5(2)(b). See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(5) (general note).
239 1980, c. 11, § 5(4). Judgments rendered by many of the U.S. regulatory agencies, such as
the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal Maritime Commission, are now subject to the § 5
prohibition on registration and enforcement.
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tion.24° Since the legislation was precipitated by British antipathy to-
ward extraterritorial enforcement of laws under which treble damages
were awarded, the prohibitionary authority accorded the Secretary of
State is more expansive than may have been anticipated. Depending
on the Secretary's use of the provisions of section 5, United States
plaintiffs in antitrust suits may not be able to recover unfulfilled judg-
ments against defendant's assets in Britain.
In effect, however, section 5 does not take from a winning litigant
in a U.S. court a privilege that was previously available. Nonrecogni-
tion of U.S. judgments abroad is the norm, not the exception. 24' In
contrast, judgments rendered in foreign countries have generally been
recognized and enforced in the United States only upon the proper ex-
ercise of jurisdiction by the rendering court and due process for the
defendant.2 42 In many instances, section 5 will impose no burden on
the successful plaintiff since there will be sufficient attachable assets in
the United States to fulfill the judgment. Long before final adjudica-
tion of a case the plaintiff may have obtained a temporary restraining
order restricting the defendant's ability to transfer assets out of the
United States.2 43 Thus, a private plaintiff may not after all be deterred
from bringing a cause of action by the nonregistrability or nonenforce-
ment provisions in the United Kingdom.
Undermining Private Antitrust Litigation. Britain's perception of the in-
adequacy of its past blocking legislation prompted more innovative
and stringent measures. Accordingly, the recovery and reciprocity pro-
visions of sections 6 and 7, respectively, raise the legal and financial
stakes for a plaintiff in the United States bringing suit against British or
British-based defendants. Unlike the other substantive sections of the
Act, section 6 is framed as an entitlement of a qualifying defendant, not
240 Id.
241 Among Common Market members,
United States judgments are not enforceable in the Netherlands because its law requires the
existence of a treaty; they are reexamined on the merits in Belgium; they are subject to a
statutory reciprocity requirement in Germany that is often difficult to establish to the satisfac-
tion of the German courts, which are accustomed to look to statutes rather than to court
decisions; and they are by statute subject to reexamination on the merits in Italy if rendered
by default. In the Scandinavian countries, a treaty is needed for enforcement. In the rest of
Western Europe, as well as in Latin America, the situation does not differ substantially.
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972), quoted in Von Mehren, Enforcement of Forei gn Judgments in the
United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401, 406 n.25 (1977).
242 [d.
243 In the Westinghouse litigation, Westinghouse followed this course and successfully ob-
tained an injunction. See note 57 supra; Getschow, Westinghouse Finds It Has Its Hands Full in
Uranium Cartel Suit, Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, at I.
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as a discretionary provision.244 As such, it is enforceable in court with-
out an intervening opinion or any official action by the Secretary of
State. By entitling citizens, domestic corporations and parties con-
ducting business in the United Kingdom to recover noncompensatory
damages paid in a foreign judgment,2 45 Britain is embarking upon legal
warfare. Clearly, the expected result is to thwart the treble damage
incentive to private plaintiffs under American antitrust laws. The im-
mediately foreseeable impact is that private parties will be compelled to
do a cost-benefit analysis that anticipates the potential frustration of
the noncompensatory portion of a judgment.2 46
The British Act sought to circumscribe U.S. extraterritorial juris-
diction or, at least, to limit its application to cases in which no counter-
vailing foreign policies were infringed. A major incentive to the British
for enacting the Protection of Trading Interests Act was that it would
induce more consideration of British policies by U.S. courts.247 There-
fore, it is somewhat ironic that the United States government objected
to the format of section 6 because "it does not leave any room for the
Secretary of State or the court to examine the facts of the case and
determine either that there is no significant United Kingdom interest in
the transaction or that United States interests outweigh United King-
dom interests. '2 48 Section 6 does not require a case-by-case review of
facts, nor does it include a procedure by which views of the foreign
country whose jurisdiction is being overturned can be taken into ac-
count.249 Furthermore, a court in the United Kingdom may entertain
proceedings on a claim for recovery without having the defendant in
the court's jurisdiction.25 0 Thus, recovery seems to be a foregone con-
clusion once the action is initiated.
In effect, Britain has neutralized the disadvantage previously ex-
perienced by foreign defendants raising foreign law objections in U.S.
courts. In doing so, it has adopted an outlook similar to the pre-
Timberlane judicial attitude in the United States, which tended to by-
pass comity arguments. Britain has gone even further to recruit opposi-
tion to U.S. practices. In section 7, other countries are encouraged to
adopt a "claw back" provision paralleling section 6.25 1 Thus, a qualify-
244 1980, c. 11, § 6(2).
245 Id. § 6(1). See CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(6) (general note).
246 See 302 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), at C-4 (Apr. 8, 1980).
247 CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11 (introductory general note).
248 Dec. U.K. Press Notice, note 29 supra.
249 See id. at 8.
250 1980, c. 11, § 6(5).
251 1980, c. 11, §7.
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ing defendant whose right of recovery is recognized in the United
Kingdom, but who finds insufficient assets there, conceivably could re-
cover against the plaintiff in any other country where such a provision
existed and the British judgment was enforceable. 2
What emerges from the diplomatic exchange between the United
States and Britain over section 6 in particular is a clear picture of in-
tractable jurisprudential differences. 253 Legal channels alone are un-
able to ameliorate the dilemma. Whereas the United States claims the
need and lawfulness of executing its antitrust laws against parties who
do not have a territorial or personal connection with the United States,
but whose actions do have a substantial and direct effect on the United
States, 254 the United Kingdom considers these laws to be appendages
of national economic policy, and hence, properly confined to a nation's
own territory or citizens. 255 The obvious rebuttal to the British view is
that intentionally unlawful acts against one country should not be im-
munized by virtue of the act having been committed in a foreign loca-
tion. On the other hand, since each country enacts its own statutes, it
becomes circular to rationalize extraterritorial jurisdiction because a
party outside of the jurisdiction violates a given law. Once a sovereign
seeks to enforce its laws in the territory of another state, controversy is
likely. There is an underlying dichotomy between the way the United
States, along with several other countries, and the Commonwealth na-
tions define their jurisdictions.
Despite these doctrinal differences, it is curious to note that, in es-
sence, section 6 operates extraterritorially. An example presented in
the diplomatic exchange between the United States Ambassador and
the British government is illustrative.256 It hypothesizes a French com-
pany with modest branch operations in both the United Kingdom and
France conspiring with its United States competitors to fix United
States prices of their product.25 7 One significant price-fixing meeting
among the conspirators was held abroad.258 A United States purchaser
uncovers the conspiracy and successfully collects treble damages under
U.S. antitrust laws.259 If the French company's U.S. branch office was
252 CURRENT L. STAT., 1980, c. 11(7) (general note). See [1980] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,414.
253 See Dec. U.K. Press Notice, note 29 supra; [1980] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,414.
254 See discussion of the Alcoa doctrine, note 8 supra.
255 See Dec. U.K. Press Notice, note 29 supra.
256 See Antitrust Realism, supra note 8, at 12.
257 Dec. U.K. Press Notice, note 29 supra.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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not its principal place of business at the time of the violation and the
violative activities were not exclusively carried on in the United States,
the defendant could recover in a British court for any noncompensa-
tory damages it paid.2 60 The "cause" upon which this action arose
would not even meet the "substantial and direct effect" test which
forms the basis of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust
law.2
6 1
Even if no other country immediately accepts Britain's challenge,
the threat of future recovery legislation in foreign countries may dis-
courage private litigants from seeking the treble damage remedy. Anti-
trust litigation is notoriously expensive and time consuming.262 It
would be naive to suggest that private plaintiffs are motivated entirely
or even principally by a commitment to uphold a competitive free en-
terprise system. The treble damage remedy is alluring and in many
cases, perhaps necessary to compensate parties for time, and monetary
and emotional expense.26 3 In the past, United States lawmakers have
considered the treble damages remedy to be the sine qua non of effec-
tive antitrust enforcement inasmuch as the federal and state enforce-
ment agencies combined cannot fully monitor or prosecute all
violations and, therefore, depend on private attorneys general.2 4 Esca-
lating tensions with foreign countries and their concomitant expression
in new restrictive statutes raise anew the need for the United States to
reconsider not merely the method of enforcing private rights of action
under the antitrust laws, but also the mitigating factors that a court
should assess when extraterritorial jurisdiction is asserted.
CONCLUSION
The extraterritorial scope of U.S. antitrust laws has created friction
26 0 id See 1980, c. 11, §6(3).
261 See note 8 supra.
262 See H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), reprinted in [1955] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2328. At the time of the 1955 amendment to the Clayton Act, Congress reviewed the
rationale behind the treble damages provision. "It was originally hoped that this would encourage
private litigants to bear a considerable amount of the burden and expense of enforcement and
thus save the Government time and money." [1955] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2329. The
enactment of section 5 of the Clayton Act, "was in part a recognition by the Congress that section
7 of the Sherman Act had not successfully stimulated private litigation for enforcement of the
Sherman Act." Id. Section 5 provides that final judgments and decrees in federal antitrust pro-
ceedings would be acceptable as prima facie evidence against defendants in private damage suits.
In fact, since the enactment of section 5, "the bulk of private antitrust litigation has followed
successful Government action, so that the judgments and decrees in the Federal proceedings could
be used to establish a case." Id.
263 Id. at 2330.
264 See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
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between the United States and its main trading partners. Many coun-
tries have reacted to this invasion of their territorial sovereignty by en-
acting nondisclosure statutes prohibiting the availability of specific
information of foreign litigants. Generally, the impact of these foreign
statutes has been minimal since litigation can proceed without certain
documents. By failing to inhibit American lawsuits based on extraterri-
torial jurisdiction, foreign governments have exposed their nationals
and their domestic business to treble damages.
The huge potential judgment in the Westinghouse uranium con-
tracts litigation induced the United Kingdom to legislate safeguards
and countermeasures. The resultant British Protection of Trading In-
terests Act of 1980 empowers the Secretary of State to prohibit compli-
ance by persons in Britain with foreign statutes and regulations that
operate extraterritorially. Also, requests for commercial documents by
foreign courts and litigants will be treated more circumspectly under
the new Act. The Act's most dramatic effect, however, will derive from
the provisions that entitle recovery of noncompensatory damages
against the winning plaintiff's assets located in Britain and that en-
courage other nations to enact comparable legislation. These provi-
sions aim at inhibiting private antitrust suits but, failing that, they
equip qualifying British defendants to strike back.
Without the economic or political control it once exercised in in-
ternational trade, the United States is under increasing foreign pressure
to pay greater heed to the doctrine of comity. Political measures by
foreign countries have not induced the United States to rethink its anti-
trust enforcement policies. Thus, for the first time, a foreign nation has
enacted legislation that allows it to deal aggressively with U.S. extrater-
ritorial enforcement. The British Act undermines the treble damage
remedy which motivates private attorneys general. Private parties in
the United States are left with the choice of either not litigating, or
litigating, but perhaps losing the noncompensatory damages. Conse-
quently, the United States must reassess the importance of conflicting
foreign laws and policies in the context of private extraterritorial anti-
trust enforcement. Unless the United States recognizes the vital inter-
ests of other countries, it can anticipate further frustration of its own
laws by aggressive foreign statutes.
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